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Judicial Review
of Administrative
Procedures in Minnesota
The author of this Article examines in detail the use of
"extraordinary remedies" in Minnesota. He analyzes the
remedies of mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, injunction, and declaratory judgment. The emphasis of the
Article is placed upon the decisions and statutory changes
which have developed since ProfessorsRiesenfeld, Bauman
and Maxwell wrote their brilliant Article entitled "Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means of the ExtraordinaryRemedies in Minnesota." Professor Baird also examines generally the current attitude of the Minnesota Supreme Court toward the subject of administrative
action in Minnesota.

Duncan H. Baird*
I.

REVIEW BY MEANS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY
REMEDIES

The term "extraordinary remedies" as used in connection with
review of administrative action is generally held to include the remedies of mandamus, certiorari, quo warranto (information in the
nature of quo warranto), prohibition, injunction, and declaratory
judgment. These were the remedies which Prof. Riesenfeld and
his associates dealt with in their brilliant and exhaustive article,
Judicial Control of Administrative Action By Means of the ExtraordinaryRemedies in Minnesota.' Since the publication of that
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Macalester College; member
of the Minnesota Bar.
1. Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action by Means of the ExtraordinaryRemedies in Minnesota (pts. 1 & 2),

33 MINN. L.

REV.

569, 685 (1949) [hereinafter cited as 33

MINN.

L.

REv.]; Riesenfeld, Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative
Action by Means of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 36 MINN.

L. REv. 435 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 36 MINN. L. REv.]; Riesenfeld,

Bauman & Maxwell, Judicial Control of Administrative Action by Means
of the Extraordinary Remedies in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1953)

[hereinafter cited as 37 MINN. L. REv.].
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article the remedies of mandamus and quo warranto and information in the nature of quo warranto have been abolished in the district courts of Minnesota by an amended Rule 81.01(2) of the
Rules of Civil Procedurefor the District Courts.2 This rule simply
provides:
The writ of mandamus and the writ of quo warranto and information
in the nature of quo warranto are abolished. The relief heretofore
available thereby may be obtained by appropriate action or appropriate motion under practice prescribed in these rules.

Quite apparently the remedies are abolished only as to the district
courts, but remain in effect as far as practice in the supreme court
is concerned. The actual results of the attempt to abolish the
remedies in the district courts have become somewhat obscured by
the court's treatment of the rule in two recent cases, Williams v.
Rolfe3 and Marine v. Whipple.4 In the Williams case a taxpayer
attempted to obtain an injunction and a declaratory judgment to
prevent a county superintendent from proceeding to issue an order
consolidating certain school districts under section 127.25 of the
Minnesota Statutes, which provides expressly for review limited to
questions of jurisdiction, excess of jurisdiction, arbitrary action,
and erroneous application of law. Plaintiff was attempting to attack the action collaterally by asserting unconstitutionality of
the empowering statute. The lower court granted the injunction
but denied declaratory relief. The defendant appealed, asserting
that plaintiff could make such a collateral attack only by means
of quo warranto. Plaintiff replied that, since the new rule abolished
quo warranto, he was merely attempting to obtain relief in accord
with the new rule. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that injunction was unavailable for that purpose, because relief by quo warranto is traditionally not available until an actual usurpation of
power has taken place and, therefore, this same limitation holds
for injunction used in place of quo warranto. Thus, the case is
a rather unclear indication that perhaps the substance of the old
writs survives and that the rule merely abolished the name rather
than the substance. In the Whipple case the court issued its writ
of prohibition to prevent a district court from proceeding with
an action aimed at requiring the county board to hold a hearing
on a petition for creation of a new school district. The court fairly
2. This amendment to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure became
effective July 1, 1959.
3. 257 Minn. 237, 101 N.W.2d 923 (1960).
4. 259 Minn. 18, 104 N.W.2d 657 (1960).
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clearly applied the old mandamus standards to the action, although it was brought under the new rule:
The proceedings sought to be prohibited are essentially what would
have been in the nature of an alternative writ of mandamus prior to
Rule 81.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . It follows that
the propriety of the order to show cause issued by the district court
should be governed by the established rules relative to the availability of writs of mandamus.5

Following the Whipple case it would seem that only the form and
not the substance of the writs has been abolished. Presumably the
form of action to be used in place of the abolished writs will be
the injunction coupled with the usual order to show cause, and the
test of availability of injunctive relief will be in each case whether
mandamus or quo warranto would have been available. It should
be stressed, however, that the matter has had no clear pronouncement by the court.
Since the writing of the Riesenfeld article, it has been made
clear by statute that declaratory relief is available to anyone injured, or threatened with injury, by administrative rules.6 Whether
the scope of the new administrative provision is broader in scope
than the old declaratory judgment action 7 is a question which has
yet to be determined, along with other possible questions under
the new statute, such as standing of potential parties or ripeness
for review. It is to be noticed that, although the Declaratory Judgments Act does not expressly provide that the existence of other
and adequate remedies is not a basis for denying declaratory re5. Id. at 19, 104 N.W.2d at 659.
6.
The validity of any rule may be determined upon the petition for a
declaratory judgment thereon, addressed to the district court where
the principal office of the agency is located, when it appears that the
rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner. . . . The declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or
not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the
validity of the rule in question.
MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1957). Upon careful reading it appears that under the terms of this statute a declaratory judgment is in order if the threatened application of the rule threatens to interfere in or impair rights. This
may be getting a bit far from the usual requirement in declaratory judgment actions of a justiciable controversy. Also, the phrase "legal rights
or privileges" will need some interpretation before we can be sure of the
scope of standing to petition under the statute. How far the last sentence
will go toward eliminating requirements of exhaustion of remedies prior
to suit is also in doubt.
7. MINN. STAT. §§ 555.01-.15 (1957).
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lief,8 this principle has been recognized in the cases9 as well as in
the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, where Rule 57 provides:
The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.

It is not at all clear whether the provisions of section 15.0416 of
the Minnesota Statutes are considered a declaratory judgment statute within the meaning of Rule 57. If not, of course, the availability of declaratory relief under the latter statute is perhaps limited. The final question, that of the relation between section 15.0416
and section 555.01, is still to be worked out. That section 555.01
applies to administrative adjudications we already know from dictum in the Williams case. At any rate, it should be kept in mind
that whatever remedy the new review statute provides, it is undoubtedly cumulative in that it does not disturb statutory appeal or
extraordinary relief already available. It should also be kept in
mind that the present Minnesota statutes on administrative procedure do not apply to several important administrative bodies, among
them the Industrial Commission and the Department of Employment Securit , "
It appears relatively safe to assert, therefore, that whatever the
situation was when it was examined by Prof. Riesenfeld and his
associates, the changes mentioned above have produced significant alteration of basic structure; it remains then for us to examine
their conclusions at some length and bring to light any further developments in the cases in the last decade.
The basic thesis of the Riesenfeld article was that the system
of review by use of the extraordinary remedies is a haphazard and
jerry-built structure. The writs themselves (mandamus, certiorari,
quo warranto, prohibition, and injunction, to which is added relief
by way of declaratory judgment, which is, of course, a statutory,
not an extraordinary, remedy) 11 have had a long evolution from
the original medieval prerogative writs, but this evolution has fallen
far short of divorcing the writs from their traditional limitations
and of producing a homogeneous and integrated system of review.
This is, in fact, the final conclusion of the authors:
8. MINN. STAT. § 555.01 (1957).
9. Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237, 101 N.W.2d 923 (1960); Connor
v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957); Barron v. City of Minneapolis, 212 Minn. 566, 4 N.W.2d 622 (1942). But see
Land O'Lakes Dairy Co. v. Village of Sebeka, 225 Minn. 540, 31 N.W.2d
660, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948); Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Billstein, 204 Minn. 224, 283 N.W. 138 (1938).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0411(2) (1957).
11. The authors mention habeas corpus as being one of the prerogative writs, but do not discuss it.
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The previous study of the existing system of review of administrative
action by means of the extraordinary remedies of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto and its supplementation by means
of the injunction and declaratory judgment shows the working of the
forces of tradition and the tenacity of the out-dated writ system at its
worst. Although the Supreme Court of Minnesota has succeeded admirably in welding the incompatible elements into a coherent and consistent pattern, the total structure still has too much resemblance to a
labyrinth in which the unwary will get lost hopelessly and even the experienced guide will occasionally take a wrong turn.' 2

Upon examination the analogy of the labyrinth is not completely
satisfactory because the actual trouble seems to be the failure of
the whole structure to fit together and, consequently, there are
overlappings or what is worse, there are holes. In outline an ideal
system of judicial control of administrative procedure would provide the following:

I. JurisdictionalRemedies.
1.

2.

3.

II.

A means to prevent agencies from trespassing into
areas not authorized by their constitutive statutes. (Excess of jurisdiction).
A means to prevent agencies from using authorized
powers in an unauthorized way. (Excess or abuse of
power).
A means to challenge the existence of the acting agency. (Usurpation of office or unconstitutionality of constitutive statutes).

ProceduralRemedies.
1.

2.
3.
4.

A means to compel an agency to begin or continue
procedures in a proper case, where such action is a
legal duty.
A means to correct erroneous application of law by
the administering agency.
A means to obtain redress for unfair, oppressive, or
inadequate procedures before the agency.
A means to challenge the factual substratum of the
agency decision upon the ground that the evidence is
inadequate according to legal standards.

These remedies ought to be provided in the light of certain
general standards applicable to the whole scheme, such as:
12. 37 MmNN. L. REv. at 32.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
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2.
3.
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That any remedy must be available at the appropriate
time;
That persons actually affected, within reasonable limits, have access to the remedy;
That the appellant should obtain all the relief to
which he is logically entitled under the circumstances,
even if it means the concurrent application of two or
more of the traditional remedies.

Reference to the plan of review as it exists in Minnesota and
as outlined by Prof. Riesenfeld and his associates shows that this
ideal is met in its rough outline only.
An analysis of the Riesenfeld article should properly begin
with a statement of the pegs upon which the whole course of the
article hangs or, to vary the metaphor, of the points which appear
to determine the whole structure of review by extraordinary
remedies.
First, there is the constitutional problem of interference of one
branch of the government in the concerns of one of the other
branches. Separation of powers is explicitly enjoined by article 3,
section 1 of the Minnesota constitution, which provides:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments-legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, ex-

cept in the instances especially provided in this constitution.

The degree of penetration of judicial review in any case is limited
by this provision to the extent that the judiciary is prohibited from
making decisions which properly lie within the legislative or executive sphere. 3 In effect this means that the judiciary is denied any
power to decide between legitimate administrative alternatives, but
can pass only upon the procedure (using this term in a broad
sense) by which an alternative was reached or upon the jurisdiction of the administrative body to make such a decision. It follows
that such a constitutional limitation will immediately give rise to a
number of specific questions concerning the exercise of discretion
by the judiciary.
Second, and related intimately to the first point, is the distinction which is to be made between administrative decisions which
are quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, administrative and purely ministerial. 4 These distinctions are not only necessary to prevent un13. See 33 MINN. L. REv. at 691.
14. Id. at 690.
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warranted trespass by the judicial power into constitutionally interdicted territory but are also ultimately related by history and
practice to the various writs. Mandamus, for example, applies only
to acts defined as ministerial or to a definitively prescribed duty to
act; certiorari applies only to acts which are quasi-judicial; prohibition applies only to a threatened exercise of judicial power
beyond jurisdiction. It is apparent at once that these categories
are blurred; the lines between them are often vague and sometimes arbitrary.' 5 It follows that the placement of a particular
administrative act within one of the above categories determines
not only the form of review but indirectly determines its scope
and timing as well. In short, we are still at the primitive stage of
judicial development where the legal characteristics of the act,
rather than the practical requirements of the total situation, prescribe the remedy.
Third, there is the problem of the application of the ancient
principle of adequate remedy. Since all the remedies (except declaratory judgment) are extraordinary or equitable remedies, they
are generally subject to the rule that they will not be applied if
another adequate remedy of a less drastic or more satisfactory nature exists,' 6 and questions often arise about the possibility of leaving the appellant to some other form of relief. Therefore, consideration must be given to questions of the relative effectiveness of
remedies,' 7 about their remoteness in time or in procedure,'"
and about the possibility of irreparable damage.' 9
Not one of these three things is a matter of precise definition;
all three of them are to some extent interrelated and depend
upon the fact situation in each instance. It requires no elaboration
to explain the difficulties of any system involving two or perhaps
three mutually interdependent variables.
Against the woof and warp of this background then, we must
consider the extraordinary remedies as they are discussed in the
15. For example, an administrative agency acting contrary to the evi-

dence in a judicial matter is reviewable only by certiorari, but if the act is
so arbitrary as to involve no exercise of discretion at all the matter is also
reviewable by mandamus as an entire failure to act. 33 Mn . L. REv.
at 593, 708.
16. 33 Mn'N. L. REv. at 595-600 (mandamus); id. at 704 (certiorari);
36 MINN. L. REv. at 446 (prohibition); 37 MiNN. L. REv. at 15 (quo
warranto); id. at 26 (injunction).
17. See 33 MINN. L. REv. at 595, where it is mentioned that mandamus will lie in cases where a remedy at law for damages is adequate but
roundabout and time-consuming; id. at 597, where prohibition and mandamus are compared along these same lines.
18. 33 MINN. L. REV. at 598, 702; 36 MiNN. L. REv. at 446, 448-49.
19. 37 MINN. L. REV,. at 26.
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Riesenfeld article. The remedies are taken up in the same order as
in the Riesenfeld article.
1.

Mandamus

Mandamus has now been replaced at least as to form by other
appropriate procedures under Rule 81.01(2) of the Minnesota
2 0 At the district court level, therefore,
Rules of Civil Procedure.
mandamus would now take the form of an application for mandatory injunctive relief through the well-known means of the order
to show cause.2 No conflict should result with injunctive relief in
its traditional role, since a mandatory injunction and mandamus
have been held to be equivalents,2" and the abolition of mandamus
by Rule 81.01 (2) ought to wipe out any lingering questions. Since
the substance of mandamus seems to continue anyway, the term
will be used as a convenient designation of the newer remedy in
the ensuing discussion.
Mandamus, or injunctive relief in lieu of it, as an administrative
remedy lies only to compel performance of a pre-existing unconditional legal duty23 by a public officer or body. It follows that if
there is any discretion involved, making the administrative act a
choice between alternatives, mandamus will not lie, and some
other form of review is necessary.2" However, in spite of this limitation mandamus can apply where the exercise of discretion by
the administrative body has been so capricious or arbitrary that it
amounts to no exercise of discretion at all, in which case the result
is to declare the administrative act void and remand the matter
with directions to act.25 At this point there is the possibility of
collision with the remedy of certiorari.2 6 Strangely enough, one of
the greatest problems in mandamus cases is to distinguish between
instances where the administrative act is discretionary and where it
is ministerial.2 For example, mandamus lay to compel a village
council to issue a building permit in a case where all preconditions
to issuance had been met and refusal was solely upon the ground
that a pending referendum, the legality of which was in question,
might invalidate a zoning ordinance which permitted the particu20. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
21. Marine v. Whipple, 259 Minn. 18, 104 N.W.2d 657 (1960).
22. See 37 MINN. L. REv. at 22. See also State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minn., 236 Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122 (1952).
23. State ex rel. Longman v. Kachelmacher, 255 Minn. 255, 96 N.W.2d
542 (1959); 33 MINN. L. REV. at 576, 578.
24. 33 MINN. L. REV. at 587.
25. Id. at 593.
26. See Ramberg v. District Court, 241 Minn. 194, 62 N.W.2d 809
(1954).
27. 33 MINN. L. REv. at 584.
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lar use.2 s The duty to issue the permit was unconditional and
against the mandamus action the village could not raise the question, collaterally, of potential illegality.
Since mandamus runs to correct an act (or failure to act) which
has a neutral character constitutionally, there is no problem of the
scope of review under this head, once it has been established that
the administrative act demanded is of a ministerial nature. In a
mandamus action the court will then try all issues which are material to a decision in the proceedings, including those of arbitrariness or capriciousness, which render a discretionary act nugatory.29 The fact that review can be complete within the area assigned to mandamus has a bearing, of course, on its desirability
as a means of review in comparison with other remedies.3" It
should be noticed, however, that mandamus by its very nature is
not used to challenge excess of jurisdiction or excess of power,
since the basis of the action is the asserted duty of the administrative agency to act, and in this respect must be considered a less
drastic remedy than either prohibition or quo warranto, or perhaps injunction.
Mandamus presents one other minor problem arising out of the
statutory requirement that the relator be beneficially interested in
the enforcement of the duty.3 1 While this provision has been
interpreted broadly, the general statements made have been broader than the actual application of the provision, and the Riesenfeld
article notes that mandamus has been denied in cases where another party has a more direct interest than that asserted by the
relator.3 2 The very absence of cases questioning standing in mandamus cases indicates, however, that the point seldom is a critical
one and only in exceptional cases should there be any need for
caution.
As when the Riesenfeld article was written, the major problem
of mandamus action is still the factual one of determining in marginal cases what is or is not a ministerial act or a complete abuse of
discretion of the kind which renders administrative action void,
and it is at this point that the unwary can make a fatal guess. If
the act is in fact not ministerial, the court has no alternative but to
refuse the relief requested and to leave the relator to other remedies.
28. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Nadasdy, 247 Minn. 159,
76 N.W.2d 670 (1956).
29. See 33 MINN. L. REv. at 603.
30. Id. at 597.
31. MnN. STAT. § 586.02 (1957).
32. 33 MINN. L. REv. at 579.
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Certiorari

In spite of the remark in the Riesenfeld article to the effect
that certiorari ranks second in usefulness to the writ of mandamus,33 a much greater number of cases are decided on review by
certiorari, which is the usual procedure to review discretionary
quasi-judicial decisions including (by statute) the decisions of a
number of important state administrative agencies.3 4 Certiorari
also involves a number of difficult questions centering in the three
main factors discussed earlier.
First, the historical scope of certiorari confines it to a review of
the record in quasi-judicial proceedings, 31 although there appears
to be no particular constitutional objection to extending it to a review of quasi-legislative acts on the same basis."s
Second, the constitutional provision against mingling of functions prohibits by its operation a review under a writ of certiorari
which goes beyond the record and substitutes the judgment of the
court for that of the agency where alternative decisions reasonably
exist.
Third, the limitation of certiorari to matters which are in or implicit in the record bears upon its relative adequacy as a remedy
in cases where jurisdictional questions are involved. Thus, for
example, in Ramberg v. District Court37 a question arose concerning the relative merits of certiorari and mandamus for review of
an order of the Industrial Commission, which the appellant asserted was void because of adoption by improper procedure. Since
this matter could not be shown by reference to the record, but
only by extrinsic evidence, it was held that certiorari was improper and that such collateral attack could only be made by mandamus.

38

33. Id. at 685.
34. For example, the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, the Insurance Commissioner, the Commissioner of Banks, the Securities Commissioner, the State Medical Examination Board, the Water Pollution Control
Commission, the Industrial Commission, the Board of Tax Appeals, the
Tax Commissioner, and the Commissioner of Employment Security.
35. Ramberg v. District Court, 241 Minn. 194, 62 N.W.2d 809 (1954);
Beck v. 'Council of the City of St. Paul, 235 Minn. 56, 50 N.W.2d 81
(1951); Nelson v. Reid, 228 Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544 (1949); Hamlin v.
Coolerator Co., 227 Minn. 437, 35 N.W.2d 616 (1949); 33 MINN. L.
REv. at 686.
36. 33 MINN. L. REv. at 691.
37. 241 Minn. 194, 62 N.W.2d 809 (1954).
38. But cf. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd., 226 Minn. 240 &
253, 32 N.W.2d 574 & 583 (1948), where the situation was somewhat
reversed. The cases involved the wrongful allocation of a civil service employee. Certiorari was first used to review the board's erroneous allocation
of relator to class attorney I, and then mandamus was combined with it to
compel reinstatement to a position as class attorney IV.

1962]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Reflection on these matters indicates that the problems of certiorari as a method of review fall into two classes. The first is
the question of what is a judicial or quasi-judicial function to
which certiorari is appropriate. The second is a question of the
scope of review once the first hurdle is crossed and certiorari is
found to be appropriate.
As to the first of these problems, the Riesenfeld article goes into
considerable detail: first, as to what is a quasi-judicial action 9
(where a functional test is developed);40 second, as to the distinction between what is quasi-legislative and what is quasi-judicial;41
and third, as to the distinction between what is quasi-judicial and
what is legislative.42 No startling innovations have appeared in the
cases since the article, although the fundamental distinctions have
been reiterated in Sellin v. City of Duluth,43 in which the court
was at some pains to point out that an administrative act may be
legislative or executive for the purpose of determining what branch
of the government it falls under functionally, but the same act may
be quasi-judicial for purposes of review-a sort of double standard, which does not seem to clarify an already tangled situation.
As to the second of these problems somewhat more can be
said. The scope of review by certiorari has been stated conclusively as the rule in State ex rel. Dybdal v. Commissioner.4 4 It
is to be noted that the Dybdal rule permits review of a situation
where the agency has not kept within its jurisdiction.45 Both excess
of power and excess of jurisdiction are apparently included under
this rubric.4" The old phrase about arbitrary and oppressive action
as being reviewable has acquired a corollary in the form of reviewability for irregularity of proceedings.4 However, as the decision in the Ramberg case4 ' makes clear, these matters must appear within the record in order to be amenable to review by certiorari, and where this is the case, certiorari is the remedy to be
preferred to other extraordinary remedies going to the matter of
jurisdiction, such as prohibition 9 or injunction.5" Certiorari is
39.
40.
Minn.
41.
42.
43.
44.

33 MINN. L. REv. at 686-98.
See also State ex rel. Huntley School Dist. v. Schweickhard, 232
342,45 N.W.2d 657 (1951).
33 MNN. L. REv. at 690.
Id. at 692-93.
248 Minn. 333, 80 N.W.2d 67 (1956).
145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920).

45. Ibid.
46. 33 MINN. L. REV. at 708 & n.340.
47. State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d
544 (1942).
48. 241 Minn. 194, 62 N.W.2d 809 (1954).
49. 36 MINN. L. REv. at 447.

50. 37 MiNN. L. REv. at 26.
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the proper method of determining in a quasi-judicial matter whether there is evidentiary support for the findings of fact made by the
administrative agency. Largely through what appears to be carelessness, the Minnesota Supreme Court has haphazardly applied a
series of tests of the sufficiency of evidence which, if taken literally, seem to be conflicting. It cannot be denied that any test in this
area is merely an attempt to verbalize a subjective attitude, but,
even so, a uniform rule would appear desirable. In Sevcik v.
Commissioner of Taxation51 the test was "whether the evidence
was such that it [the Board of Tax Appeals] might reasonably
make the determination in question," while in Hamlin v. Coolerator Co.52 the question was whether the decision of the agency was
"sustained by the evidence." A somewhat more objective test was
applied in Judd v. Sanatorium Comm'n,5 where the function of
the reviewing court was to "determine whether the findings have
sufficient basis of inference reasonably to be drawn from the facts."
But in a similar case only two years later the court became somewhat more vague by stating that itwould affirm if"there issufficient competent evidence to support the findings. . ... 54 A
somewhat more complex test was proposed in Caputa v. Land
O'Lakes Creameries, Inc.,55 where itwas said that findings of
the agency will stand "unless a consideration of the evidence and
the permissible inferences require reasonable minds to adopt contrary conclusions." Itisto be understood, doubtless, that the court
did not mean exactly that, but meant that reversal would occur
only where reasonable minds were all compelled to an opposite
conclusion. A still more obscure rule is that set out in Schmoll v.
J. W. CraigCo.56 where itwas said:
A mere preponderance of medical testimony does not prevent a trier
of fact from reaching a conclusion to the contrary where such conclusion is sustained by other reasonable testimony . . . . All the testimony must be considered, and when that is done and there is still

room for reasonable minds to come to different conclusions, a case is
presented where a court of review cannot disturb the findings ....

In State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd.5" it was held that the
court must reverse in a case where there is no supporting evidence
51.
52.
53.
54.

257 Minn. 92, 104, 100 N.W.2d 678, 687 (1959).
227 Minn. 437, 448, 35 N.W.2d 616, 622 (1949).
227 Minn. 303, 306, 35 N.W.2d 430, 433 (1948).
Williams v. W. W. Wallwork, Moorhead, Inc., 231 Minn. 244, 246,

42 N.W.2d 710, 711 (1950).
55. 234 Minn. 514, 516, 48 N.W.2d 895, 896 (1951). See also McGuire
v. Viking Tool & Die Co., 258 Minn. 336, 104 N.W.2d 519 (1960).
56. 228 Minn. 429, 433-34, 37 N.W.2d 539, 542 (1949).
57. 226 Minn. 240, 249, 32 N.W.2d 574, 580 (1948).

19621

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

or "the evidence as a matter of law compels a finding contrary to
the administrative one"--a possible example of tautology. In
the same vein there are a number of cases5" which assert that
reversal can only be ordered where the findings are "manifestly" or
"clearly and manifestly" against the evidence. And in Graf v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 9 the court put in a little of everything by
holding that it would not disturb findings below "unless . . .
manifestly contrary to the evidence" and if, after consideration
"of the evidence and of the inferences which may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom, reasonable minds might reach different conclusions upon the question. . . ." The court is perhaps
making a distinction between the situation where it is seeking to
uphold findings in the face of some evidence on both sides and the
instance where it is justifying an overturn of the administrative
findings. It is quite apparent that findings will be upheld on considerably less evidence than is required to force a reversal. It is
submitted, however, that the rule can be stated in either case in
the same terms, to wit: that findings of fact cannot stand unless,
upon all the evidence in the entire record, they could be reached
by a reasonable mind.
The matter of what evidence can be relied on in such cases
raises the question of the "legal residue" rule, which says that in
any event no finding can stand unless it is supported by a residue
of legally competent evidence. This rule does not appear to be in
effect in Minnesota,6" and it is a little too exacting for application in administrative cases.
Examination of the dealing with the question of sufficiency of
evidence reveals that the court does not always distinguish between
findings of fact on the one hand, where it is more or less bound
to take the administrative findings as they are, and conclusions
of law where it is free, under review by certiorari, to substitute its
conclusions for those of the administrative agency. This confusion
occurs typically in those instances where there is a so-called mixed
question of law and fact and where it is difficult to separate what
is law from what is fact. The court, for example, has no difficulty
in substituting its legal interpretation for that of an agency in case
of an interpretative ruling," but some difficulty is experienced in
58. Honeymead Prods. Co. v. Christgau, 234 Minn. 108, 47 N.W.2d 754
(1951); Nelson v. Reid, 228 Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544 (1949); Amundsen
v. Poppe, 227 Minn. 124, 34 N.W.2d 337 (1948).
59. 234 Minn. 485, 490, 49 N.W.2d 797, 800-01 (1951).
60. See Stronge & Lightner Co. v. Commissioner, 228 Minn. 182, 36
N.W.2d 800 (1949).
61. See Sevcik v. Commissioner of Taxation, 257 Minn. 92, 100 N.W.2d
678 (1959).
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cases where it is necessary to consider a "fact" such as employment, which can be either a fact or a legal relation. Such confusion
occurred, for instance, in Hamlin v. Coolerator Co.,62 where the
court applied the rule of evidentiary support to uphold a conclusion of law-in this case the legal effect under the statutes of the
terms of a labor contract. A similar confusion appears to have been
made in other cases.63
In one respect the remedy of certiorari is freer of difficulty, and
this is in regard to the matter of parties having standing to appeal.
In the usual case, of course, the appellant is without question entitled to standing, as a party to the proceeding before the agency. 4
This is not the complete test, however, since a person whose substantial legal rights are directly affected by operation of administrative action probably may appeal by certiorari even though not a
formal party to the record.65 This is the same test as that applied
in the cases of statutory appeal.6"
3.

Prohibition

Prohibition is one of the more drastic and specialized writs, used
at the present time to prevent administrative agencies from adjudicating matters outside their competency.6 7 Like certiorari, the
writ runs only against those matters which are deemed to be
quasi-judicial," and for this reason the court held in O'Neill v.
Kallson69 that prohibition was not available to prevent a county
auditor from placing plaintiff's name on an election ballot, since
this was not a quasi-judicial act but a ministerial one because the
auditor's duty was prescribed by statute in such cases and involved
no discretion. The other requirements for review by prohibition
62. 227 Minn. 437, 35 N.W.2d 616 (1949).
63. Koktavy v. City of New Prague, 246 Minn. 550,
(1956); Nelson v. Reid, 228 Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544
Sanatorium Comm'n, 227 Minn. 303, 35 N.W.2d 430
Williams v. W. W. Wallwork, Moorhead, Inc., 231 Minn.

75 N.W.2d 774
(1949); Judd v.
(1948); but see
244, 42 N.W.2d

710 (1950).
64. 33 MINN. L. REv. at 701 & 711.
65. See In re Acquisition of Flying Cloud Airport, 226 Minn. 272, 32

N.W.2d 560 (1948), in which appellant predicated its right to appeal upon
the fact that it was a taxpayer upon whom acquisition of an airport
would have an adverse effect. The court held that this was insufficient
interest to sustain the right of appeal.
66. See In re County Ditch No. 15, 238 Minn. 15, 55 N.W.2d 305
(1952); Singer v. Allied Factors, Inc., 216 Minn. 443, 13 N.W.2d 378
(1944); Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L.
REv. 353, 422 (1955).

67. 36 Mnur. L. REv. at 436. See MINN. STAT. §§ 587.01-.05 (1957).
68. State ex rel. Minnesota Amusement Co. v. County Bd., 255 Minn.
413, 96 N.W.2d 580 (1959).
69. 222 Minn. 379, 24 N.W.2d 715 (1946).
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are that the administrative body be about to exercise its power illegally and that there be no other adequate remedy at law.7" It is
at once apparent, then, that in prohibition one will encounter
the same difficulties as are encountered in certiorari in determining
what is quasi-judicial. 7
The most difficult question in the application of prohibition
seems to be its relation to other remedies, particularly in view of the
fact that it involves a somewhat delicate problem of timing since it
applies prospectively to action which is threatened. The first problem under this heading grows out of the distinction between administrative acts in excess of jurisdiction and those in excess of
power. The line between these two is very fine in many cases;
nevertheless, it is the rule that the writ applies only to prevent usurpation of judicial power, that is, excess of jurisdiction, and not
to prevent excessive use of power,7 2 for which the appropriate
remedy is either injunction or certiorari if the illegality appears on
the face of the record.
An equally difficult question, especially in view of prohibition's prospective operation, is the matter of relative adequacy of
remedy.73 In State ex rel. Adent v. Industrial Comm'n,74 relator
sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Commission from proceeding to hear a claim on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
over the employer; a preliminary determination of the jurisdictional
point was, therefore, necessary to prevent a possible waiver of the
jurisdiction of the Commission by a general appearance on the
merits. Prohibition was denied on the ground that the jurisdictional point could be raised on appeal and the added expense of a
defense on the merits was not a sufficient burden to justify resort
to prohibition. The relator was then left to his remedy by way of
certiorari. By contrast there was the situation in State ex rel.
Sheehan v. District Court75 in which the insurance commissioner
sought the writ to prohibit the district court from enjoining him
in a proceeding against an insurance company allegedly engaged
in unfair practices under the statute. The court stated that prohibition was available only where there was no adequate remedy at
70. State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, 253 Minn. 462, 93 N.W.2d

1 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959); Nemo v. Hotel Employees
Local 556, 227 Minn. 263, 35 N.W.2d 337 (1948); 36 MINN. L. REv.
at 438.
71. See O'Neill v. Kallson, 222 Minn. 379, 24 N.W.2d 715 (1946); 36
MINN. L. REV. at 439.

72.
73.
74.
75.

36 MINN. L. REv. at 443-45.
Id. at 445-50.
234 Minn. 567, 48 N.W.2d 42 (1951).
253 Minn. 462, 93 N.W.2d 1 (1958).
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law, and found that in this case such remedy did not exist even
though the Commission could have appealed from the injunction
suit against him in case of an adverse verdict; the resultant delay
in enforcement of the statutes would constitute an "undue and
detrimental delay to be inflicted upon the public . ..
Even
a cursory examination of these two cases taken together will reveal
a rather involved calculus of factors is used by the court to determine the point of adequacy of remedy. It may be questioned, for
example, how far the public interest was determinative in the
Sheehan case.
One point which has not yet been resolved in any manner by
the Minnesota cases is the question of ripeness of a proceeding
for control by prohibition. The Riesenfeld article notes that "it is
necessary that the judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings are either
imminent or already commenced but still in progress. 77 However,
it is noted that no cases have yet passed upon the question of when
an application for the writ is premature.7 1 This gap in the law has
not as yet been filled by any pronouncement.
One other point about prohibition ought to be noted in passing,
and that is that the writ is available only from the supreme court,79
a jurisdictional requirement which may reduce the number of occasions on which litigants have resort to it.
4.

Quo Warranto

The abolition of the form, at least, of quo warranto proceedings
by Rule 81.01(2) of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure
would seem to follow from the treatment of the writ of mandamus
which was abolished by the same rule at the same time."0 No case
involving quo warranto-type relief has as yet been decided under the
new Rule, but there seems little reason to doubt that it will be accorded the same treatment as mandamus. However, the question
is somewhat complicated because of the historic requirement that
the attorney general consent to the application where the relator
is a private party. While the rules about this consent are far from
clear, 1 it does appear that "the strictest requirements apply where
a private relator wishes to attack the legal existence or scope of
the franchise of a municipal corporation," 2 which is precisely the
76. Id. at 467, 93 N.W.2d at 5.
77. 36 MINN. L. REv.at 442.
78. Id. at 442 n.416.
79. MINN.STAT. §§ 480.04, 587.01 (1957).
80. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
81. See 37 MINN. L. REV. at 7-15. The article refers to the "most

perplexing questions" raised by this requirement of consent. Id. at 7.
82. Id. at 11.
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office of the writ as a means of judicial control. Somewhat less
stringent are the requirements to test a right to exercise a public
office, where it appears that a private relator can do so if he claims
the office himself; if he does not, certainly consent of the attorney
general is necessary. 3 It would follow that under the revised
procedure prescribed by Rule 81.01(2) the prudent practitioner
would either attempt to join the attorney general as an applicant
for injunctive relief, or obtain his endorsement of approval on the
application for the order to show cause why such relief should not
be granted. This requirement is based on the supposition, already alluded to, that the form, rather than the substance, of the
writ has been done away with.
Since the function of quo warranto is the drastic one of challenging the validity of official acts by attacking the right of the
acting officials to act as such officials, the writ has a somewhat
limited application. Traditionally, the writ lies to test three kinds of
official action: usurpation, nonuser, and misuser of office; there is
not too much trouble with the first two. 4 The identification of
misuser is more difficult because it is necessary to distinguish misuser from mere ultra vires acts of an official.8 5 This distinction is
apparently a matter of degree which in the end must be left to the
courts. However, it is clear that quo warranto is the proper procedure to prevent any governmental unit from exercising its powers
beyond its de jure geographical limits.8 6 It therefore applies to
review the legality of annexations of territory by governmental
units.17 However, the attack on the particular body must be direct and not collateral. In State ex rel. Grozbach v. Common
School Dist. No. 65S" relator attempted to test by quo warranto
the validity of a school bond issue on the ground that the assumption of indebtedness by the school board under a reorganization
plan was illegal. It was held that quo warranto could be used to
test the legality of the school board's right to office, but not the
legality of the bond issue; in short, the writ cannot be used to test,
collaterally, the legality of official actions, but only the actual right
to office. However, the constitutionality of a statute may be collaterally attacked by a challenge, by means of quo warranto, of the
right of officials to act under it. Thus, in State ex rel. La Jesse v.
83. Id. at 14. See also State v. Dahl, 69 Minn. 108, 71 N.W. 910 (1897).
84. 37 MINN. L. REV. at 4.

85. Ibid.
86. Id. at 5.
87. State ex rel. Harrier v. Village of Spring Lake Park,-245 Minn. 302,
71 N.W.2d 812 (1955).
88. 237 Minn. 150, 54 N.W.2d 130 (1952).
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Meisingers9 the relator challenged the appointment of a special
municipal judge on the ground that the statute under which the
latter was appointed was unconstitutional. A writ of ouster under
the writ was issued on the ground of unconstitutionality.
It should be borne in mind that the remedy of quo warranto
actually consists of two remedies: a statutory action to prevent
usurpation and to vacate charters and letters patent, which can be
brought either in the district courts or in the supreme court but
only by the attorney general,9 0 and a common-law writ of quo
warranto, available to private relators in either court. 9' Rule
81.01 (2) would appear to apply to both of these.
5.

Injunction
While not technically an extraordinary remedy, injunction qualifies as such by reason of its nature as an equitable remedy and its
requirement of no other adequate remedy. Unlike other extraordinary remedies, such as mandamus and certiorari, the nature of the
administrative act is not a factor in the granting of injunctive relief,9" and while this permits escape from the complicated tangle
typical of other remedies, it still leaves substantial questions of
ripeness for review, of adequacy of remedy, and of scope of review.
The question of ripeness for review in the case of injunctive relief comes up as a question of relative imminence of real or substantial injury.93 The court discussed the matter thoroughly in
Thomas v. Ramberg,94 where plaintiff sought an injunction to
prevent promulgation by the Industrial Commission of rules in
the process of adoption by alleged illegal procedures under a
statute. The defense was that until the rules were adopted the injunction suit was premature; after adoption, there was a statutory
remedy by way of certiorari. In this situation the court held that
plaintiff should not have his injunction because of absence of imminent irreparable injury.
[Albsent a showing that plaintiff is faced with the actual or imminent peril of sustaining irreparable harm-that is, real and serious in-

89. 258 Minn. 297, 103 N.W.2d 864 (1960).
90. MINN.STAT. §§ 556.01-.13 (1957).
91. MINN. STAT. § 480.04 (1957).
92. Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1, 60 N.W.2d 18 (1953); Martin
v. Wolfson, 218 Minn. 557, 16 N.W.2d 884 (1944); 37 MIN L. REV.
at 20.
93. Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237, 101 N.W.2d 923 (1960); Jenswold
v. St. Louis County Welfare Bd., 247 Minn. 60, 76 N.W.2d 639 (1956);
Thomas v. Ramberg, supra note 92; Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of
Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49 N.W.2d 804 (1951); J. F. Quest Foundry Co.
v. Local 132, International Molders Union, 216 Minn. 436, 13 N.W.2d
32 (1944); 37 MINN. L. REV. at 27.
94. 240 Minn. 1, 60 N.W.2d 18 (1953).
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jury-if the pending administrative proceedings are continued to their
final completion, the sole allegation that the administrative agency has
or is about to exceed its jurisdiction is not of itself sufficient to invoke
injunctive relief .... 95

Consequently a plaintiff is to be left to his administrative remedies
unless he can show a special interest which will be immediately
affected by administrative action based upon jurisdictional defects,
or unless the cost of administrative procedures under the circumstances is prohibitively high.9" In the usual case, therefore, the
plaintiff will be held to an exhaustion of prescribed remedies.
Since injunction is an equitable remedy, the availability of another adequate remedy will bar its use. 9 T As usual, however, the
test of adequacy is a relative one, and so injunction is the appropriate remedy in a case where the scope of a statutory remedy was
not quite extensive enough to review defects in administrative procedures.9" In a similar way it applies to cases which are for technical reasons just beyond the scope of review by the extraordinary writs, for example, cases of official misconduct which do not
constitute "misuser" reviewable by quo warranto. 99
Scope of review is not such a problem in the case of injunction
as in the case of the more restricted extraordinary remedies, although the scope of review by injunction is related to questions of
ripeness and relative adequacy of remedy. The simplicity of questions in this area is traceable principally to the fact that injunction
lies in any kind of situation: quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, administrative or ministerial. 100 It is also true that under injunction
the requirements of standing to sue are not as restrictive as they
are in the case of certiorari or the statutory appeals since injunc95. Id. at 5, 60 N.W.2d at 20.
96. See Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237, 101 N.W.2d 923 (1960).
97. 37 MiNN L. RPv. at 26. This rubric is so well established that it
scarcely needs any further support. See Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237,
101 N.W.2d 923 (1960).
98. Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237, 101 N.W.2d 923 (1960).
99. 37 MINN. L. REV. at 26.
100. The rule is stated in this form in Martin v. Wolfson, 218 Minn.
557, 16 N.W.2d 884 (1944). Later cases illustrate the point. For example
Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237, 101 N.W.2d 923 (1960), involved an
attempt to interfere by injunction with a legislative process-the formation of a new school district. Injunction would have been the proper remedy
if the school district had been formed at the time of suit. In Nielsen v. City
of St. Paul, 252 Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d 853 (1958), an injunction was denied
(on other grounds) in a case involving administrative acts; see also Otter
Tail Power Co. v. Village of Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49 N.W.2d 804
(1951); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49
N.W.2d 197 (1951). In Jenswold v. St. Louis County Welfare Bd., 247
Minn. 60, 76 N.W.2d 639 (1956), the administrative action involved was
quasi-judicial.
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tion is available to anyone who can prove damage or imminent
threat.'' It is this principle which permits a taxpayer to bring suit
in certain cases where his standing is based upon unwarranted
expenditures or other action which would increase his tax burden. 02
While injunctive relief can be used to rectify illegal action, it is still
subject to the limitation imposed by the constitutional requirement
of separation of powers. For this reason injunction cannot go so
far as to prescribe how either quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative discretion shall in fact be used, or conversely, will overturn such
exercise only where it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable as
a matter of law. 30 This is again the matter of reviewing procedure, rather than attempting to substitute the judgment of the court
for that of the agency where a choice of alternatives truly exists.
The main difficulty with the use of injunction is, then, its actual
breadth and flexibility, which tempt the unwary practitioner into
attempting judicial control by this means rather than by the appropriate extraordinary writ. And since the application of injunction is determined by the bounds of the scope of the extraordinary
writs, to the extent those bonds are blurred, so is the area in which
the injunctive remedy applies.
It has already been noted in connection with the discussion of
remedy by mandamus that the mandatory injunction is probably
now the form which that remedy will now take. Since the substance is still the same as the former writ, no further discussion of
mandatory injunction is needed here.
6.

DeclaratoryJudgment

Even a hasty review of administrative review in Minnesota
should convince the student that the remedy of declaratory judgment is one of the most neglected methods of review. The remedy
has a great many advantages: it has broad application to all types
of administrative action;" 4 it can be granted in spite of other al101. 37 MINN. L. REV. at 20; see Thomas v. Ramberg, 240 Minn. 1,
60 N.W.2d 18 (1953).
102. See Jenswold v. St. Louis County Welfare Bd., 247 Minn. 60, 76
N.W.2d 639 (1956); Phillips v. Brandt, 231 Minn. 423, 43 N.W.2d 285

(1950).
103. Nielsen v. City of St. Paul, 252 Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d 853 (1958);

Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d
197 (1951).
104. MINN. STAT. § 555.01 (1957) simply provides, in part, that "courts
of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
rights, status, and other legal relations . . . ." Under interpretations of this
statute all that is necessary is a legal interest or right in the hands of a
party legally competent to assert it. See 37 MINN. L. REv. at 28.
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ternative or adequate remedies;1"5 standing to bring an action is
not restricted as in the case of certiorari or statutory appeal. 106 It
can be brought to determine the status of rights under a threatened
situation,' which tends to reduce sensitivity to ripeness questions. The critical factor in the application of conventional declaratory judgment 0 s is the necessity for the presence in the case of a
justiciable controversy. Upon examination the term "justiciable controversy" obviously is one which implies some kind of immediacy
of conflict, and the conclusion, then, is that this immediacy may
be tested in one or more dimensions. Therefore, the limits of application of declaratory judgment may be tested in terms of standing of persons applying for it, which in turn is a function of their
remoteness from the subject matter of the action."0 9 Or the requirement of justiciable controversy may appear as critical in cases
where the threat of injury or conflict is remote. For example, in
Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n"0 plaintiff
brought an action under the statute to have himself declared
eligible for a pension. The defendant association had taken no official action except to indicate their opinion that plaintiff was ineligible in a letter to the plaintiff, replying to his informal notification of intention to apply. The defense was that the suit was prematurely brought, because there was no justiciable controversy at
least until formal denial. The court held that the suit was timely
brought, there was a justiciable controversy, plaintiff asserted a substantial legal right which was challenged, and declaratory relief
was intended to apply in just such cases. While the controversy
may seem in this case to be somewhat remote, the court had in
mind the plaintiffs alternative, which was to quit his job, to apply
for pension, and upon refusal then to sue. If the suit failed, how105. "No action or proceeding shall be opan to objection on the ground
that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for." MINN. STAT. §
555.01 (1957). This is supplemented by Rule 57, Minnesota Rules of Civil

Procedure, which provides that "the existence of another adequate remedy
does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is
appropriate." The same view is expressed in the cases. See, e.g., Connor v.
Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
106. The statute makes no statement about the standing of parties. Declaratory relief is available to any party having a legal right or interest.
See note 104 supra.
107. Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d
789 (1957); Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 218
Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d 122 (1944); 37 MINN. L. REV. at 27.
108. That is, as provided by MINN. STAT. §§ 555.01-.15 (1957), as distinguished from the administrative remedy provided by MINN. STAT. §
15.0416 (1957).
109. 37 MINN. L. REv. at 28.

110. 218 Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d 122 (1944).
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ever, plaintiff could not return to his job because of age limitations,
and so by quitting he would hazard all upon the chance that his
view of his pension rights was correct.
Of particular interest to those seeking some kind of quick review
of administrative action is the availability of declaratory judgment
even in the face of other administrative remedies, and this is true
not only of those cases where the prescribed administrative remedies
are insufficient,"' but also to cases where they are. An example
of the latter instance is the case of Connor v. Township of Chanhassen," in which plaintiff's right to proceed with a declaratory
judgment action was challenged on the ground that he had not exhausted administrative remedies, which in fact he had not. The
court permitted the plaintiff to continue on the ground that since
declaratory judgment is intended as an alternative form of relief,
and the other prerequisites of standing and a threatened legal right
were present, the case was a proper one for declaratory judgment.
The court stated, "We are presented here with a controversy as to
legal rights which requires judicial interpretation and are of the
view that the declaratory judgment action was an appropriate
remedy."" 3 This rule is not applicable where the plaintiff has not
resorted to remedies which are considered to be exclusive." 4
Attention has already been directed to the statute providing for
declaratory relief for the purpose of reviewing rules made by administrative agencies."-5 So far no cases have been decided in the
Minnesota Supreme Court under the statute; therefore, it is premature to attempt to answer the questions which can be raised about
its scope and application. It probably is safe to say that the statute
will be interpreted as far as possible in accordance with settled
view of declaratory judgment actions. Since the statute describes
the relief afforded by it as "declaratory,""11 6 there seems to be
little doubt about the application to the statute of the terms of Rule
57 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure; but even if this is
not so, the statute in its last sentence declares that "the declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has
first requested the agency to pass on the validity of the rule in
111. Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
112. 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957).
113. Id. at 209, 81 N.W.2d at 794.
114. Land O'Lakes Dairy Co. v. Village of Sebeka, 225 Minn. 540, 31
N.W.2d 660, cert. denied, 334 U.S. 844 (1948); Farmers & Merchants
Bank v. Billstein, 204 Minn. 224, 283 N.W. 138 (1939); 37 MNN. L.
REv.at 29.
115. MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1957). See note 6 supra.

116. "The validity of any rule may be determined upon the petition for
a declaratory judgment thereon . . . ." MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1957).
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question"--a provision which seems to be aimed at eliminating
requirements for prior exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Because of its purely "declaratory" nature a petition for declaratory judgment is often combined with application for injunctive
relief, and the two together form a system of complete relief. 17
If there is any objection at all to the use of declaratory judgment
as a means of judicial control of administrative action, it is that its
status as an alternative remedy even at the "threatening" stage of
administrative proceedings may cause its application to such proceedings at a time when declaratory relief is in fact premature, giving rise to situations of unwarranted judicial interference in the
course of administrative proceedings. This would be more true of
the adjudicative type of administrative action than of the rulemaking type, where the review statute permits declaratory judgment even if no further administrative procedures have been requested by the petitioner.' s So far there do not seem to be any
cases in which such interference has been unwarranted," 9 possibly because lower courts are cautious to deny declaratory relief
in such cases either upon the ground of exclusiveness of the provided remedial scheme or upon the ground of no justiciable controversy. But there seems to be no reason why courts could not
legally interfere in administrative procedures in this way.
II.

THE JUDICIAL CONCEPT OF THE SCOPE OF REVIEW

The analysis of the law contained in Part I is incomplete for the
purposes of this study unless supplemented by some exposition of
the current attitude of the Minnesota Supreme Court toward the
subject of the scope of review of administrative action generally.
It would certainly be presumptuous, if not improper, to say that
no such attitude exists; however, it is correct to say that it does not
exist in any systematized form. The outlines of the concept must
117. This method was attempted in Williams v. Rolfe, 257 Minn. 237,

101 N.W.2d 923 (1960). However, the lower court in that case had denied

the requested
reported case,
deemed to be
formal action;

declaratory relief for reasons which do
but granted injunctive relief. On appeal,
premature since the administrative body
therefore, standing unsupported by any

not appear in the
the injunction was
had not yet taken
declaratory decree,

the injunction collapsed. This raises the interesting question of the propriety

of an injunction in a case where declaratory relief has already declared a
threatened act to be illegal, unconstitutional or improper. Can such a
declaratory decree support an injunction in a case where the injunctive
relief alone would not be granted?
118. See MINN. STAT. § 15.0416 (1957).

119. But see Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dept. Relief Ass'n, 218

Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d 122 (1944), a case which was saved from possible

charges of this nature only because of the peculiar facts of that case.
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therefore be gathered from a study of the ad hoc application of
principles from case to case. This is not to say, however, that the
system as it has evolved is without reason or purpose, or that it
makes no sense. On the contrary, unsystematized as it is, the scope
of judicial review is nevertheless reasonably well adapted to its
primary function, which is to bridge the transition from administrative procedures to judicial ones. On the other hand, the court
appears in some instances to have come out at the proper place,
but for the wrong or irrelevant reasons.
1.

Scope of Review Limited by Constitutional Provisions

The most important limitation on the scope of judicial review
is the positive provision contained in article 3, section 1 of the Minnesota constitution, which divides the state government into "distinct departments"--legislative, executive, and judicial brancheswhose respective powers cannot be exercised by either of the other
branches. 2 ' The supreme court has universally interpreted this as
preventing it, or any other court, from substituting its judgment upon review for that of an inferior tribunal on anything except questions of law. It seems apparent that the court has fallen into this
attitude through an understandable tendency to follow the line of
least resistance and to apply rules already familiar to it in the field
of appellate procedure. 2 ' The exact nature of the proceedings in
the administrative agency therefore make no difference; the court
will apply a rule of non-disturbance of findings of fact by administrative agencies whether the administrative process be legislative, executive or administrative.' 22 It is to be understood, of
course, that this rule is subject to the usual exception that review
of findings of fact does not prevent a court from investigating to
120. MINN. CONST. art. 3, § 1 reads as follows:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments-legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person or persons
belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any
of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in the
instances expressly provided in this constitution.
121. See 1 DUN. DIG., Appeal & Error, §§ 384, 388, 392 (3d ed. 1951)
and cases cited therein.
122. State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Sec. Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 176
N.W. 759 (1920). Quasi-legislative action: Northern States Power Co. v.
City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 489, 99 N.W.2d 207 (1959); State ex rel.
McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'r, 253 Minn. 62, 91 N.W.2d 154
(1958); In re Consolidation of School Dist., 246 Minn. 96, 74 N.W.2d 410
(1956); Northern Pac. Ry. v. City of Duluth, 243 Minn. 84, 67 N.W.2d
635 (1954); St. Paul City Ry. v. City of St. Paul, 242 lvfinn. 188, 64
N.W.2d 487 (1954); In re Independent Consol. School Dist. No. 16, 241
Minn. 454, 63 N.W.2d 543 (1954). Administrative action: State ex rel.
McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'r, supra; State ex rel. Ging v. Board
of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942).

1962]

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

475

find out whether,
by some test, the findings are legally unsupported
2 3
by evidence.
The particular form of judicial review, whether by statutory form
or extraordinary remedy, likewise makes no difference. The court
has refused to substitute its discretion in cases where a statutory
appeal has been provided,' 24 in the certiorari line of cases, 2 in
cases where an injunction is sought,'2 6 and especially in the mandamus cases. 2 7 It also follows that the rule applies whether the
review is confined to a review of the record only' or whether
it permits introduction of evidence dehors the record,' 29 although
some question may then be raised concerning the use of evidence
dehors the record.
There is only one exception to the rule, if indeed it is an exception at all, and that is the often asserted judicial right to review the rate base in proceedings by the Railroad and Warehouse

Commission to fix rates for public utilities and its corollary, the
right to review compensation awards by trial de novo in eminent
domain proceedings. In both these cases the rationale is that the
right to compensation is one which is constitutionally guaranteed
and, therefore, the court must be free to examine the total situation to determine whether the compensation provided in fact meets
a standard of due process. 20 In rate-making cases, then, the
123. Ibid.
124. State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'r, 253 Minn. 62,
91 N.W.2d 154 (1958); In re Consolidation of School Dist., 246 Minn. 96,
74 N.W.2d 410 (1956).
125. That is, today, in the long line of cases stemming from the Dybdal
case.
126. Nielsen v. City of St. Paul, 252 Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d 853 (1958);
Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d
197 (1951).
127. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Nadasdy, 247 Minn. 159,
76 N.W.2d 670 (1956); State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minn., 236
Minn. 452, 54 N.W.2d 122 (1952); Muehring v. School Dist. No. 31, 224
Minn. 432, 28 N.W.2d 655 (1947); Zion Ev. Luth. Church v. City of
Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn. 55, 21 N.W.2d 203 (1945). Of course, if there is
any discretion to be exercised on the part of the administrative body,
the remedy of mandamus by definition does not apply.
128. As in the certiorari cases and the other cases following the Dybdal
rule.
129. Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 86
N.W.2d 657 (1957). This case was decided under a statute, MINN. STAT.
§ 216.25 (1957), which permits evidence dehors the record on appeal.
The court in Minneapolis St. Ry., supra at 61, 86 N.W.2d at 670, held:
The function of the district court is to determine whether, in the
light of all the evidence presented before the commission and district
court, the commission's order was lawful and reasonable . . . TMhe
court may not substitute its judgment for the findings of the commission and it may not try the case de novo.
130. See St. Paul City Ry. v. City of St. Paul, 242 Minn. 188, 64 N.W.
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court is able to indulge itself in a rather unconvincing bit of sophistry that it is not in fact fixing rates at all, but is determining
the legal sufficiency of the rate base and the reasonableness of the
specified return in the light of due process requirements.' 3 1 It
goes without saying that this approach of the court has been subjected to criticism; 132 and while it is difficult to see why, sophistry
or not, such extensive review ought to be granted in these cases if
not allowed elsewhere, the tradition of such review poses a practical question of the feasibility of eradicating it for the sake of

mere conformity. It is not amiss to point out that the federal rule

is evolving in a different direction. 133
The stringency of the Minnesota constitutional requirement of
separation of powers has had the effect of preventing the court
from moving into areas of review which it is not equipped to enter

and which on any sound theory of judicial review it should not
enter. The Minnesota system of judicial review has thus been able
to avoid some of the difficulties encountered under the federal system of review, where the courts have not had a clear constitutional
barrier and where, as a result, the courts have had a more difficult
time confining themselves to a purely appellate role. To the extent
that the court has invoked the constitution as the basis for its refusal to trespass upon administrative discretion it is assigning a
sufficient reason for its action, but not necessarily a logical one.
2d 487 (1954); Arrowhead Bus Serv. v. Black & White Duluth Cab Co.,
226 Minn. 327, 32 N.W.2d 590 (1948). In Northern States Power Co. v.
City of St. Paul, 256 Minn. 489, 493, 99 N.W.2d 207, 211.,(1959), for
example, it was said:
We have often held that prescribing or fixing rates for a public
utility involves a legislative function which may not be usurped by the
courts.
It is equally well settled that some form of judicial review of the reasonableness of rates fixed by the ratemaking body is an essential requirement in the exercise of due process.
This entire matter of the requirements of the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions and their bearing upon judicial review will
be considered at length infrain subsection 2 of Part II.
131. The best statement of this rule occurs in St. Paul City Ry. v. City
of St. Paul, 242 Minn. 188, 64 N.W.2d 487 (1954). See also the discussion
infra in subsection 2 of Part II.
132. 4 DAvis, ADMIISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 29.09, 29.08 (1958);
Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Question of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. L. REv. 1055
(1932); Mendelson, Smyth v. Ames in State Courts, 1942 to 1952, 37
MINN. L. REV. 159 (1953).
133. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942); Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, opinion amended, 311 U.S. 614
(1940); 4 DAvis, ADMINisTRAT vE LAw TREATISE, § 29.09 (1958). But see
Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutional and JurisdictionalFact, 70 HARv. L.
REv. 953 (1957).
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The circumstance that the two happen to coincide should not permit the distinction to go unnoticed.
There are a large number of review statutes which provide expressly for trial de novo of some or all of the fact issues in the administrative determination. 34 It seems clear that if the determination in any such case is legislative or executive in nature then such
trial de novo must be unconstitutional. This exact point was made
in the recent case of State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 35 which involved the discharge of a civil service officer
and appeal from this discharge under Minnesota Statutes, section
197.46, which provides, in part, upon such appeal "issues of fact
shall be framed upon motion of either party and the trial thereof
." The district court to which appeal was
shall be by jury ...
taken permitted trial de novo with jury trial of disputed facts, but
the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
on the ground that the discharge action was administrative even
though accomplished in a "judicial" manner; the statute providing
trial de novo was, therefore, unconstitutional because it was an unwarranted trespass. 36 The court was apparently aware of the implications of its holding for other statutes of a similar nature, for
it commented:
McGinnis also cites numerous statutes dealing with appeals from
such administrative bodies as the Minnesota Board of Nursing, State
Board of Pharmacy, Commissioner of Insurance, etc. These statutes all
use the words "de novo" in their provisions for review by the district
court on appeal from the particular administrative body involved. The
village on the other hand cites several cases where the statutes have
used the words "de novo" and the courts have held that the function
being performed by the board is not judicial and have construed the
In regard
words to allow only a limited review in the courts ....
to this contention two things are to be noted: (1) The wording of the
review sections of those statutes are [sic] not the same as the provisions for review in the statute before us; (2) those statutes are not before us on this appeal. Thus, whether review of orders from the adis to be full or limited
ministrative bodies concerned in those statutes
37
is not to be considered or decided at this time.

We can assume that from now on the court will not permit trial
de novo in the face of an express statute authorizing or directing
it if the action being reviewed is legislative or administrative. But
134. E.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 49.18, 64.26, 82.07, 88.37, 88.49, 145.07,
148.261, 151.06, 160.22, 168.68, 178.09, 257.111, 325.62, 326.16, 326.335,
380.13, 381.10, 431.23 (1957).
135. 253 Minn. 62, 91 N.W.2d 154 (1958).
136. Compare Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 80 N.W.2d 67
(1956).
137. 253 Minn. at 72, 91 N.W.2d at 161.
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it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine to what degree the
court will resort to its power of interpretation to remove any administrative action from these categories and to characterize it as
judicial in nature, and how far, even in such "judicial" cases, the
court will feel itself qualified or empowered to review previously
found facts.
In theory the constitutional inhibitions on exercise of other powers by the judiciary do not apply to review by the court of administrative actions which are purely judicial, and the court has made
statements implying as much.'
The implication would seem to
be that here trial de novo is permitted. However, at this point any
authorizing statute runs into another constitutional block in the
form of the rule that constitutionally granted powers cannot be
delegated; therefore, delegation of pure judicial power to an administrative body would be unconstitutional. 9 The conclusion is
that any such power granted to an administrative body is "quasijudicial" and applies only to the form of the proceeding, rather
than to the actual content of it. Thus, the court has recently held
that "a particular act may be administrative for the purpose of deciding which branch of the government it comes under but judicial
for the purpose of allowing review by certiorari .
*...1 The
fact that a proceeding may be judicial in form does not mean
it is judicial or quasi-judicial; rather, a functional test is to be applied regardless of the form of the proceedings, and this has been
made clear in the careful opinion in the McGinnis case, 4 ' where
it was said:
However, it cannot be said that the character of the act alone determines whether a given function is judicial or non-judicial for the
purpose of determining into which branch of the government that func138. State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'r, 253 Minn. 62,
91 N.W.2d 154 (1958); Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 80 N.W.2d
67 (1956); State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d
544 (1942); Hunstiger v. Kilian, 130 Minn. 474, 153 N.W. 869 (1915).
Where pure judicial power is concerned, the courts may, of course, try
de novo, as in the case of appeals from justice courts. See MINN. STAT.
§ 532.41 (1957).
139. State ex rel. Turnbladh v. District Court, 107 N.W.2d 307 (Minn.
1961); State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'r, 253 Minn. 62,
91 N.W.2d 154 (1958); Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 80 N.W.2d
67 (1956); State v. Nolan, 231 Minn. 522, 44 N.W.2d 66 (1950); Hunstiger
v. Kilian, 130 Minn. 474, 153 N.W. 869 (1915); Steenerson v. Great No.
Ry., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N.W. 713 (1897); State ex rel. Hart v. Common
Council, 53 Minn. 238, 55 N.W. 118 (1893). MINN. CONST. art. 6, §
1, vests "judicial power" in the courts.
140. Sellin v. City of Duluth, 248 Minn. 333, 337, 80 N.W.2d 67, 70

(1956).
141. 253 Minn. 62, 91 N.W.2d 154 (1958).
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tion falls. The decision cannot turn on the fact that the given function
142
involves such things as formal charges, notice, and hearing.

To characterize an administrative action as "quasi-judicial," then,
is merely to define the extent of judicial review, which is the "certiorari" scope of review, or to put it more plainly, review in accordance with the rule of State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Sec.
Comm'n 43 as modified by State ex rel. Ging v. Board of
Educ.'" The rule as so modified specifies five grounds upon
which review may be sought:
(a) The administrative body had no jurisdiction.
(b) The administrative body exceeded its granted powers.
(c) Action of the administrative body was arbitrary, capricious and totally unreasonable.
(d) The administrative findings of fact were not properly supported by evidence.
(e) There was procedural irregularity.
The result, then, of the combined operation of the constitutional
principle of no delegation of powers is to place all administrative
action-quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and executive-(with the
exception of rate-making and eminent domain) on exactly the
same level, and in the absence of some restriction upon the scope
of appeal, imposed either by statute or by the method of review
selected by the appellant, to apply the same standard to the whole
group. Except as the identification of administrative action as
"quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" happens to bear upon the
choice of the extraordinary remedies, the court might just as well
characterize all administrative action which is not unconstitutional
as "administrative" and, therefore, subject to review under the
modified Dybdal rule.
2.

Scope of Review Required by Constitutional Provisions

If on the one hand the Minnesota constitution operates as a barrier to judicial control of administrative action, it also operates to
require certain areas of review. Care should be taken to distinguish
between constitutional requirements of procedural fair play 45 and
constitutional requirements relating to scope of review, which are
142. Id. at 69, 91 N.W.2d at 159. See also State ex rel. Turnbladh v.
District Court, 107 N.W.2d 307 (Minn. 1961).
143. 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920).
144. 213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942).
145. These procedural requirements operate at the level of administrative proceedings, and consequently fall beyond the scope of this work. In
the Minnesota cases, the doctrine seems to stem principally from Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1940), which was imported into Minnesota
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a different matter entirely. And while the constitutional requirements are not many, mention of them is certainly necessary.
The constitutional requirements stem from the "due process"
clauses of the Minnesota constitution 46 and the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Article 1, section 7 of the Minnesota constitution provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law, and no person for the same offense shall be put twice
in jeopardy of punishment, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.

The last clause is further fortified by the provisions of article 1,
section 13 of the Minnesota constitution:
Private property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation therefor, first paid or secured.

These provisions of the Minnesota constitution, taken together,
appear to be much more explicit on the matter of property rights
than does the fourteenth amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.

These due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions
require the reviewing court to examine the factual basis of a finding even in the face of a statutory provision making certain evidence conclusive if, in fact, such conclusiveness deprives the appellant of his day in court or of his rights, or is manifestly contrary
law in State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 213 Minn. 184, 6
N.W.2d 251 (1942). The court, citing the Morgan case, held:
Neither the federal nor the state constitution guarantees any particular form of administrative procedure . . . . All that is required is
"adherence to the basic principles that the legislature shall appropriately determine the standards of administrative action and that in administrative proceedings of quasi-judicial character the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play." Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14 . ...
213 Minn. at 191-92, 6 N.W.2d at 258. This basic position was reiterated
a year later in the leading case of Juster Bros. v. Christgau, 214 Minn. 108,
7 N.W.2d 501 (1943). See also Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 256 Minn. 227, 98 N.W.2d 60 (1959); State v. Duluth, M.
& I.R. Ry., 246 Minn. 383, 75 N.W.2d 398, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 804
(1956); Festler v. Wallach, 245 Minn. 222, 71 N.W.2d 836 (1955); In re
Amalgamated Food Handlers, 244 Minn. 279, 70 N.W.2d 267 (1955).
146. MINN. CONST. art. 1, §§ 7, 13.
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to the actual underlying state of facts in the matter. A presumption
cannot be substituted by statute for a fact and be made conclusive. Thus, in the leading case of Juster Bros. v. Christgau1" the
court held unconstitutional a rule, promulgated by the Commissioner of Employment and Security pursuant to statute, which purported to permit the Commissioner to make a binding determination of the applicable employers' contribution rate without, however, any hearing on the matter. Due process forbade the cutting
off by this means of the employer's right to a hearing and to the
presumption of evidence which would have clearly rendered unjust the rate as fixed. The court said:
Could the legislature, without violating the due process clauses of the
state and federal constitutions, delegate to the commission or director
the power to make a binding determination of the employer's contribution rate without affording the employer an opportunity to be heard
and to show the actual facts bearing upon such rate? If such power did

not exist, it will not be presumed that the legislature .. .itself does
not have the power to declare what shall be conclusive evidence contrary to the fact ....
"The legislature cannot in this manner provide for the arbitrary exercise of power, so as to deprive a person of his day in court to vindicate his rights. And the law which closes his mouth absolutely when

he comes into court is the same, in effect, as the law which deprives

him of his day in court." [Citation omitted.]
Clearly, what the legislature cannot do itself is ultra vires an administrative body .... 148

However, the constitutional rule is not violated by a statute which
raises presumptions which are reasonable and operate merely to
shift the burden of proof. "Unquestionably the legislature, or its
administrative adjunct, may declare that certain things shall constitute prima facie evidence or create a rebuttable presumption."1 49
A statute which did exactly that (Minnesota Statutes, section
expressly upheld in State & PortAuthority v. Northern
216.25) 8was
0
Pac.Ry.'
Constitutional due process, both state and federal, likewise requires review in cases where the activities of an administrative
board result in alleged confiscation, and this review must go farther than a mere review of the record for sufficiency of evidence.
Since the law in Minnesota seems to be somewhat cloudy on this
issue, a little elaboration is desirable. The cases falling in this category are, of course, principally cases involving rate-making for util147.
148.
149.
150.

214 Minn. 108, 7 N.W.2d 501 (1943).
Id. at 117, 7 N.W.2d at 506.
Id. at 118, 7 N.W.2d at 507.
229 Minn. 312, 39 N.W.2d 752 (1949).
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ities, which are governed by applicable statutes having varying
provisions. An authoritative expression of the doctrine occurs in
Western Buse Tel. Co. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. 5' in which
Mr. Justice Wilson said:
The same statute [i.e., the statute providing for appeals in rate-making cases) must also be and is construed as meaning that the appeal
to the district court contemplates, when the question of confiscation is
involved, that that tribunal will also make its findings as if it tried the
case in the first instance. It can no longer be said to be the law that
the order of the commission is final and conclusive under the statutory
direction that it would be considered prima facie reasonable. The appellant is entitled to have the issue of confiscation submitted to a judicial tribunal for determination
upon its own independent judgment
1 52
as to both the law and the facts.

Significantly, the court relied heavily upon the authority of Ohio
Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough,' a leading federal
case in which the same view was enunciated in 1920. In 1936
the United States Supreme Court decided the case of St. Joseph
Stockyards Co. v. United States,'54 in which the Court reaffirmed the rule that in cases where confiscation was alleged the sufficiency of the administrative body's findings was to be reviewed
by the appellate court for the purpose of reaching an independent
judgment. Then, both the Western Buse and the St. Joseph cases
formed the basis for a very extensive discussion of the doctrine in
the Minnesota case of State v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co.,15 5 in
which Chief Justice Gallagher, speaking for the court, adopted the
language of the St. Joseph case 5 6 in respect to the matter of independent judgment:
Legislative declaration or finding is necessarily subject to independent
judicial review upon the facts and the law by courts of competent jurisdiction to the end that the Constitution as the supreme law of the
land may be maintained. Nor can the legislature escape the constitutional limitation by authorizing its agent to make findings that the
agent has kept within that limitation . . . . But to say that their findings of fact may be made conclusive where constitutional rights
• . . have been invaded, is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative officials and seriously to impair the security inherent in
157
our judicial safeguards.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

188 Minn. 524, 248 N.W. 220 (1933).
Id. at 530, 248 N.W. at 223.
253 U.S. 287 (1920).
298 U.S. 38 (1936).
204 Minn. 516, 284 N.W. 294 (1939).
298 U.S. 38, 51-52 (1936).
204 Minn. at 529, 284 N.W. at 303.
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And he decided that an allegation of confiscation warranted
independent judicial review:'
It is agreed that the company is entitled to a judicial determination of
the issue of confiscation . . . that it is the duty of the court in passing
upon that issue to make findings of fact . . . and that the rulings of
the commission upon questions of law are without finality ....

In adopting the language of the St. Joseph case, however, Chief
Justice Gallagher also adopted the rationale of that case, which
dealt with the evidentiary effect of the administrative agency's
findings, a matter not made clear in the Ben Avon case. The
court noted that the Ben Avon case stands for the proposition that
"the district court, when reviewing an allegedly confiscatory order
of the commission, must weigh the evidence and determine the
facts upon its own independent judgment and without the least regard to the findings of the commission,"' 5 9 but added that "since
the Ben Avon Borough case the United States Supreme Court appears to have receded from the position there taken."'160 This
reliction, the court intimates, must perforce be in the direction of
the rule which existed prior to Ben Avon, that is, that administrative findings were conclusive provided they had a legally adequate
basis in the evidence. Caught between the Ben Avon position of
independent judgment and the opposite position of conclusiveness of findings, the court takes the middle way out offered by the
St. Joseph case:
But this judicial duty to exercise an independent judgment does not

require or justify disregard of the weight which may properly attach
to findings upon hearing and evidence. On the contrary, the judicial
duty is performed in the light of the proceedings already had and
may be greatly facilitated by the assembling and analysis of the facts

in the course of the legislative determination. Judicial judgment may
be none the less appropriately independent because informed and
aided by the sifting procedure of an expert legislative agency ...

The established principle which guides the court in the exercise of its
judgment on the entire case is that the complaining party carries the
burden of making a convincing showing and that the court will not interfere with the exercise
of the rate-making power unless confiscation
61
is clearly established.'

This sort of reasoning would seem to justify the trenchant remark
of one commentator that "the difference between such a partially
dependent judgment and the test of reasonableness or substantial
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 525-26, 284 N.W. at 302-03.
Id. at 525, 284 N.W. at 302.
Ibid.
298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936).
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evidence is left unclear; for all that 1appears
the difference may
62
have become negligible or nonexistent.'
The court does not mention the possible effect of the statute,
Minnesota Statutes, section 237.25, under which the appeal in the
Tri-State case was brought, which provides that "at such trial the
findings of fact made by the commission shall be prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated, and the order shall be deemed
prima facie reasonable . .. .
The court's pronouncements since the Tri-State case leave some
doubt as to the present attitude of the court. Thus, in 1948 1in
63
Arrowhead Bus Serv. Inc. v. Black & White Duluth Cab Co.
the court was called to pass upon the propriety of the action of a
district court which upon review of an order of the Railroad and
Warehouse Commission had heard evidence de novo and had made
its own order. By way of dictum, the court said: "In a proper case,
[the appellate court] may determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or examine questions of law arising
from such findings or in rate cases determine whether rates are
confiscatory."' 64 The last clause, being in addition to the express
right to pass upon the legal sufficiency of the evidence, might be
interpreted as a revival of the Ben Avon doctrine, or at least a reassertion of the modified Tri-State rule. One should not lose
sight of the fact that this statement was made by the Minnesota
Supreme Court after further significant developments at the national level from which it could be inferred that the United States Supreme Court had finally rejected the Ben Avon rule. 6 ' In 1940
the Court decided Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Rowan & Nichols
Oil Co.,'66 in which case it was argued that administrative proration orders, which prorated oil well production, were discriminatory. The Supreme Court refused to review the orders, saying that
the fixing of proration formulas was a legislative function, and
where there appeared to be a choice between reasonable alternatives, the courts could not exercise the power of discretion. In
1942, soon after the Rowan & Nichols case, the Court decided
FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline.6 ' This case involved the validity of
a rate fixed by the Federal Power Commission under a statute authorizing the FPC to fix "just and reasonable" rates and making
162. 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 29.09 at 165 (1958).
163. 226 Minn. 327, 32 N.W.2d 590 (1948).
164. Id. at 329, 32 N.W.2d at 592.
165. See on this entire subject 4 DAvis, ADmINISTRATVE LAW
TREATISE, § 29.09 (1958).
166. 310 U.S. 573, opinion amended, 311 U.S. 614 (1940).

167. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
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the findings of fact by the commission conclusive "if supported by
substantial evidence." The Court was unconcerned with independent judgment on the matter of confiscation and was content to go
no farther than the statutory authorization of examination to determine substantial evidentiary support. And in 1944 the Court
added another indication of its position in FPC v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., "s where it reaffirmed its position in the Natural Gas
Pipeline case and, in addition, aimed a blow at the entire idea that
rate-making involved confiscation at all.
In 1949 the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Twin City Motor Bus Co. v. Rechtzige 6 9 under Minnesota Statutes, section
216.25, the provisions of which are identical to the section quoted
above from Minnesota Statutes, section 237.25. The court in the
Rechtzigel case held:
On appeal from an order of the commission under § 216.25, the
district court must examine the evidence before the commission in
order to determine whether it reasonably supports the commission's
order. Apparently, it may receive additional evidence, but only for the
purpose of determining whether, in the light thereof, the commission's
order becomes illegal or unreasonable as unsupported by the evidence

as of the time of its making. It cannot retry the matter and substitute
its own findings for those of the commission. 170
And the court avoided the question whether appellant could raise
on appeal for the first time the matter of confiscation, pointing out
that an affirmative argument would rest upon the Western Buse
and St. Joseph cases.
The position of the Rechtzigel case was reaffirmed in State &
Port Authority of St. Paul v. Northern Pac. Ry. 71 and Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Village of Rush City,172 both of which appear to reject, at least in the case of Minnesota Statutes, section 216.25, any
idea of independent judgment. Final expression of the rule, at
least as regards appeals under statutes in the form of Minnesota
Statutes, section 216.25, appears in State v. Duluth, M. & I. R.
Ry.,1 71 in which the court first noted that any attempt on the
part of the court to try a rate-making matter de novo would be
unconstitutional as an invasion by the court of the legislative
sphere. The court then stated the rule:
168. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
169. 229 Minn. 196, 38 N.W.2d 825 (1949).

170. Id. at 204, 38 N.W.2d at 829.

171. 229 Minn. 312, 39 N.W.2d 752 (1949).
172. 230 Minn. 144, 40 N.W.2d 886 (1950).
173. 246 Minn. 383, 75 N.W.2d 398, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 804

(1956).
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We have held in a number of cases that the rule of review by the
district court is the same as that of an appellate court in reviewing the
findings of a jury. There is, however, an obvious difference in procedure, in that, on reviewing the order of the commission, the trial court
may receive new evidence not submitted to the commission, while a
review in this court of the findings of a jury is limited to the record
made in the trial court. As was said by Mr. Justice Hallam in State v.
G. N. Ry. Co. . .. [130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W. 247 (1915)] it does
seem somewhat anomalous to hold that the order of the commission is
prima facie reasonable and lawful and that, on appeal, new evidence
may be received to overcome the prima facie standing of the order
and that, at the same time, the trial court cannot hear the case de
novo. However, it is now clear that such evidence is admitted for the
limited purpose of testing the reasonableness and the lawful nature of
the order.174

It is submitted that there is good ground for the court's anomalous feeling and that its attempt at resolution of the difficulty is
not itself completely clear or satisfactory. Some further confusion is
added when one considers the court's decision in Minneapolis St.
Ry. v. City of Minneapolis,"75 which adopted the rule inthe line
of cases just discussed, but then expressly adopted the view of the
Hope case that the old "fair value" rule of Smyth v. Ames 17 6 was
no longer applicable, at least where the applicable statute did not
use those words.
While the above cases seem to point to some attrition of the position the court took in the Western Buse case, there are other indications in an opposite direction. For example, in St. Paul City
Ry. v. City of St. Paul'7 7 there was an appeal by the City of St.
Paul from orders of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission fixing fares, and on such appeal the district court made independent
findings of fair value and reasonable rate of return. Itwas objected
that the court lacked such power. However, the supreme court upheld the power of the district court in this respect, pointing out
that the statute expressly provided for trial de novo inthe district
court, 7 8 and furthermore, that such a process was not "fixing a
174. Id. at 394, 75 N.W.2d at 406. This case is cited by Professor
Davis as proof of a rejection by Minnesota of the Ben Avon rule. 4
DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 29.09 at 177 (1958).
175. 251 Minn. 43, 86 N.W.2d 657 (1957).
176. 169 U.S. 466 (1897).
177. 242 Minn. 188, 64 N.W.2d 487 (1954).
178. The statute here involved was MINN. STAT. § 220.15 (1957),
which provides that upon appeal
[t]he matters involved therein shall be tried and determined by the
court without a jury in the same manner as though originally commenced therein . . . . Upon any appeal the district court shall have
jurisdiction of and try the whole matter in controversy including mat-
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rate"---a legislative function-because the court was merely finding independently some of the elements that entered into a determination of the rate. The latest pronouncement of the court is found
in Northern States Power Co. v. City of St. Paul,1 9 which was decided under Minnesota Statutes, sections 451.07 and 451.08, which
authorize cities to fix utility rates but provide no means of review.
In this respect the case can then be distinguished from both the
Minneapolis St. Ry. case where the statute expressly provided for
trial de novo, and the St. Paul City Ry. case and others like it
where the statute provides that administrative findings are prima
facie correct. The court said:
Just where the legislative function involving the power to fix rates
ends and the judicial function involving a review of the reasonableness
of such rates begins, is not always easy to determine. It is clear, how-

ever, that while the courts may not usurp the legislative function of

ratemaking, neither are they impotent to grant relief from confiscatory
or noncompensatory rates established by the ratemaking authority.
Courts must and do have the power to prevent the unlawful taking of

property without due process of law by the establishment of rates

which are confiscatory or noncompensatory.180

The court then found it unnecessary to go further into this matter
since the sole question in the case was the propriety of the granting
of a temporary injunction on the enforcement of the rates pendente
lite.
It is significant that in this case the court had a clear opportunity to express the law, if it had chosen to do so, and to clear
away some of the questions about scope of review in rate-making
cases. Instead, the court chose to make the general statement
above with its reference to the power of courts to check confiscatory rates as a matter of due process, all of which has the overtones at least of the Ben Avon rule.
In view of all of the foregoing cases, it can be said that the law
in Minnesota is far from clear on several points. First, it is doubtful how far, and under what conditions, the court will go in permitting trial de novo, the admission of additional evidence, or the
exercise of independent judgment by the court. Second, it is doubtful whether the court has rejected the Ben Avon rule where conters of fact as well as law and make findings upon all material
facts ....

It is to be noted that this statute, the Brooks-Coleman Act, was enacted
in 1921, (L.1921, ch. 278), after the Ben Avon decision; the court in
the Minneapolis St. Ry. case expressly distinguished the St. Paul City Ry.
case on the ground of the difference in statutes.
179. 256 Minn. 489, 99 N.W.2d 207 (1959).
180. Id. at 494, 99 N.W.2d at 211.
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fiscation by fixed rates is alleged. Third, the court has left in
doubt a wide zone in which it can, if it chooses, avoid the implications of the separation of powers rule by making the determination of certain facts or conditions "judicial" instead of "legislative"
(i.e., the determination by the court of a fair rate base is not legislative; only determination of the rate thereon is legislative). Perhaps the safest course to take in regard to the Ben Avon rule is
to regard its demise with the same scepticism shown by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Opinion of the Justices81
in passing on this same question. After reviewing many of the
cases cited above, that court observed:
One writer announces that the doctrine of these cases [i.e., the Ben
Avon case] has "gradually died," because of subsequent decisions incon-

sistent with it. Davis, Administrative Law, § 255, at page 8919.
Per2
haps so, but we would prefer to see the death certificate.'

Again, also on due process considerations, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that it will review administrative action
even where the legislature attempts to make the administrative action final in the sense of providing a single administrative remedy.
8 3 the court was faced with a contenIn Breimhorst v. Beckman1
tion that the Workman's Compensation Act was invalid since it cut
off the employee's common-law action against his employer or the
malefactor and left him to a quasi-judicial remedy. It was held that
this process was not unconstitutional as long as the usual judicial
review was provided. A similar result was reached in Fairview
Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. Union,' in which the right of
certain classes of employees to strike was removed by statute in
favor of compulsory procedures.
In still another class of cases, the court, if called upon to do so,
must exercise its power to prevent usurpation of power. This class
of cases involves the question of delegation of legislative power
by the legislature to administrative agencies. Underlying the problem is the strict constitutional provision regarding separation and
exercise of powers;15 and this provision has been interpreted by
the courts as prohibiting the delegation of legislative power. The
most complete formulation of this rule appears in the case of Lee
v. Delmont,8 ' which also has the virtue of being comparatively
181. 328 Mass. 679, 106 N.E.2d 259 (1952).
182. Id. at 683, 106 N.E.2d at 262. For a view in accord, see Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Constitutional and JurisdictionalFact, 70 HIv.
L. REv.
953 (1957).
183. 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719 (1949).
184. 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954).
185. MIN. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
186. 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530 (1949).
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recent. In that case the court was dealing with the matter of a legislative delegation to the Board of Barber Examiners of power to
make rules and regulations. There was no question but that the
delegation was very broad, particularly in the grant of power to
prescribe the matters upon which the applicants for barbers'
teacher licenses were to be examined."8 7 Speaking through Mr.
Justice Matson, the court said:
It is elementary that the legislature-except where expressly authorized by the constitution, as in the case of municipalities-cannot delegate purely legislative power to any other body, person, board or commission. . . . Although purely legislative power cannot be delegated,
the legislature may authorize others to do things (insofar as the doing
involves powers which are not exclusively legislative) which it might
properly, but cannot conveniently or advantageously, do itself. . . . It
does not follow, because a power may be wielded by the legislature
directly, or because it entails an exercise of discretion and judgment,
that it is exclusively legislative. . . Pure legislative power, which
can never be delegated, is the authority to make a complete law--complete as to time it shall take effect and as to whom it shall applyand to determine the expediency of its enactment. Although discretion to determine when and upon whom a law shall take effect may
not be delegated, the legislature may confer upon a board or commission a discretionary power to ascertain, under and pursuant to the
law, some fact or circumstance upon which the law, by its own terms
makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. The power to ascertain facts, which automatically brings a law into operation by virtue
of its own terms . . . and not according to the whim or caprice of
the administrative officers, the discretionary power delegated to the
board or commission is not legislative.lSS

A careful study of this exposition may justifiably result in a certain
amount of confusion in the mind of the reader. First, it appears

that delegation of legislative power is bad, if it is a delegation of

"pure" legislative power. Next, the court moves to a definition of
"pure" legislative power, which turns out to be the power to make
a complete law; and then there appears to be a further definition.
The power to make a complete law is, according to the Delmont
case, the power to decide upon the expediency of the law; upon
its content; upon the time it is to take effect; and upon the objects of the legislation, that is, the persons upon whom it is to take
effect. It is to be assumed that the legislature could not delegate

to any other body the power to exercise in any one case all four
187. The statutes governing the matter of licensing of teachers in barber
schools are MINN. STAT. §§ 154.065-.07 (1957). MINN. STAT. § 154.065
(5) (1957) grants power to the Board of Barber Examiners to "make appropriate rules and regulations to carry out the intents and purposes" of
the act.
188. 228 Minn. at 112, 36 N.W.2d at 538.
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of the powers which taken together (at least according to the
court's test) constitute legislative power; at any rate, it is obvious
that if the statement from the Delmont case is to be taken literally
a body other than the legislature may exercise bits or parts of the
legislative power without running afoul of constitutional inhibitions. Thus, while an administrative body cannot determine the
time when a law is to take effect (which is one of the elements of
legislative power), an administrative body can determine "facts"
or the existence of "facts" which determination is enough to activate the law according to its own terms. Just how much sophistry
there is in this position is a matter of individual judgment. Perhaps it might be argued that indeed the court's position is sound
if in fact the administrative agency has a duty to find the existence
of the facts, so that its function is purely ministerial. But this is not
the case, for the court has held that there is no unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power even where the power to find the
critical facts is to be exercised by the administrative agency at its
own discretion." 9 A more obvious delegation of the actual power
to decide whether a law shall come into effect or not is hard to
imagine. And although in the Delmont case the court stated that
"discretion to determine . . . upon whom a law shall take effect
cannot be delegated," an examination of the cases indicates that
the court has permitted arrangements which come very close to
such delegation. For instance, in Thomas v. Housing & Redev.
Authority9 ' the Minnesota Housing and Redevelopment Act was
challenged on the ground that a delegation to the commissioner of
administration of the power to determine who were eligible lowincome families was unconstitutional. The court found the act to
be constitutional since the duty imposed upon the commissioner
was purely ministerial; he had only to determine eligibility upon a
calculation of "net family income falling within the lowest 20 percent by number of all family incomes in the area of operation"''
and this position was not altered by a power granted to the commissioner to modify this statutory standard where the commis189. Johnson v. Richardson, 197 Minn. 266, 266 N.W. 867 (1936);
State ex rel. Benson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 186 Minn. 524, 243
N.W. 851 (1932). In Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 274 N.W. 165
(1937), officials were empowered to collect delinquent real estate taxes
by distrainment of rentals due the owner from tenants of the property. It
was totally discretionary with the officials when and where they would
apply the remedy, if at all, but the statute was upheld against the claim
that it amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of power. This discretion was justified, according to the court, because of the necessity of keepvarying situations.
ing the remedies flexible to fit
190. 234 Minn. 221, 48 N.W.2d 175 (1951).
191. Mn, .STAT. § 462.491 (1957).
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sioner believed such modification of the standard was necessary
"to make satisfactory progress in the provision of low-rent housing . . .,12 With this kind of authority behind them the court
had no trouble a few years later in Welsand v. Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n 9 3 in holding constitutional a rule of the commission which distinguished between common carriers by truck
and contract carriers by truck, and applied different rules to each.
Another of the elements of legislative power which presumably
cannot be delegated, although the Delmont case does not expressly
say so, is the power to decide upon the content of the law. It is
at this point that there appears the well-worn rule that no con-

stitutional prohibition is violated if the administrative agency simply fills in the details of a plan which the legislature has sufficiently outlined by the provision of adequate standards. 9 ' The
Minnesota court, conceding that "the policy of the law and the
standard of action to guide the administrative agencies may be
laid down in very broad and general terms,"'' nevertheless
appears to insist upon some legislative standard.'9 6 Upon examination, however, this insistence tends to lose a considerable part of
its force, since the court has carried quite far the principle that
adequate standards are present in the delegating statutes. For ex192. Ibid.
193. 251 Minn. 504, 88 N.W.2d 834 (1958). Compare Reyburn v.
Minnesota State Bd. of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 78 N.W.2d 351 (1956),
in which it was charged that a statute, MiNr. STAT. § 148.57 (1957), was
unconstitutionally broad because it granted to the Board the right to revoke optometrists' licenses for "unprofessional conduct" and defining the
term "unprofessional conduct" by various standards "among other things."
The court upheld the statute against the complaint that the phrase
"among other things" left the definition up to the whim of the Board. It
was the court's view that the term "unprofessional conduct" imported its
own standard without more since, as a practical matter, it had a widely
understood ethical content.
194. See generally 1 DAvis, ADMimISTRATrV LAW TREATISE, § 2.11
(1958); Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. Union, 241 Minn. 523,
64 N.W.2d 16 (1954); Hassler v. Engberg, 233 Minn. 487, 48 N.W. 343
(1951); Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530 (1949); State
ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts, Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 223 Minn. 175, 25 N.W.2d 718 (1947); Johnson v. Richardson, 197 Minn. 266, 266 N.W. 867 (1936). The clearest statement of the
rule occurs in the FairviewHospital case.
195. Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 114, 36 N.W.2d 530, 539 (1949).
For similar language see Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. Union,
241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16 (1954); Welsand v. Railroad & Warehouse
Comm'n, 251 Minn. 504, 88 N.W.2d 834 (1958); State ex rel. Dison v.
Hanson, 248 Minn. 87, 78 N.W.2d 679 (1956).
196. Lee v. Delmont, 228 Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530 (1949); Fairview
Hosp. Ass'n v. Public Bldg. Serv. Union, 241 Minn. 523, 64 N.W.2d 16
(1954); State ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts, Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul
Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 223 Minn. 175, 25 N.W.2d 718 (1947).
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ample, as early as 1937 the court in Cook v. Trovatten"9 I had
no trouble with a statute which left up to the commissioner of
agriculture the right to determine the time, manner and other details of proceedings to rescind wholesale produce dealers' licenses.
In Welsand v. Railroad & Warehouse Comm'n'9 8 a power to define classes of truckers was inferred from the mere mention, without further definition, of two such classes in the statute. And in
State ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts, Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul
Metropolitan Airports Comm'n 9 9 the court had to deal with a
statute which conditioned a state license to operate an airport in
the metropolitan area upon "approval" and "consent" of the commission. It was contended that the use of these words without more
left it entirely at the whim of the commission to approve or
deny approval of a local airport as no standards were prescribed
in the statute. The court held that the statute was not an unconstitutional delegation of power to the commission, since the requirement of "consent" or "approval" must be interpreted against
the background of the broad purposes and powers of the act setting up the commission,"' and in particular those delegated duties relating to air safety. While this approach is not entirely illogical or unjustified, it does seem to come fairly close, at least in
this case, to a judicial attempt at "bootstrap lifting."
While it would undoubtedly be rash to assert that the constitutional requirement of standards is dead, it is certainly true that
the court will go to considerable lengths to uphold delegating
statutes. It would also be true to say that a statute with no standards at all, either express or implied, would be considered to be
an unconstitutional delegation of power. However, it seems unlikely that any statute, enacted with the usual opening statements of
policy and with some fairly clearly designated area of application,
is likely to be held unconstitutional. A rough, but not by any
means sure, test of constitutionality might be to examine the particular statute; if no more than one of the elements of legislative
power is left to the discretion of the agency, then there is a pretty
good chance that the statute will be held constitutional. It is interesting to note what may possibly be a clue to the court's thinking
about this whole problem in the holdings in two of the more recent cases. In both State ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts, Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n201 and Thomas
197. 200 Minn. 221, 274 N.W.165 (1937).
198. 251 Minn. 504, 88 N.W.2d 834 (1958).
199. 223 Minn. 175, 25 N.W.2d 718 (1947).
200. See MINN. STAT. §§ 360.018(9), 360.11 (1957).
201. 223 Minn. 175,25 N.W.2d 718 (1947).
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v. Housing & Redev. Authority," 2 the court upheld a very broad
delegation of power on the ground that it could not be held to be
illegal since it must be assumed that the grantee of the power will
act legally. In the Thomas case, for example, the court held that
they could not "anticipate that the commissioner will take unconstitutional action under the statutes" and, therefore, would not
take any action until he did; this is tantamount to saying that
a grant of power is not an illegal grant of power until it is illegally exercised-a novel view indeed. Regardless of the logic of
the matter, it may be argued that this type of case indicates that
the court is not so much interested in legislative grants of power
but, rather, is more inclined to direct its efforts against the unreasonable use of such power after it has been delegated, applying
perhaps the well-known tests of arbitrariness, whim, capriciousness,
and plain unreasonableness in the premises, which are exactly the
tests, of course, that the court would apply to any legislation.
3.

Scope of Review Upon Challenge of the Jurisdiction

The right to challenge the jurisdiction of the administrative
body is one which, in theory at least, is amply hedged by constitutional safeguards. As the court said in Martin v. Wolfson:2 3
The Constitution is a standing guarantee to all litigants that the order

or judgment of any board, commission, or court must fall, whenever

attacked, upon a showing that fundamental requirements have not

been observed.

Whatever be the character of a particular administrative act, wheth-

er executive, quasi-judicial, or quasi-legislative, its legality may be inquired into by a court, even in a collateral proceeding.

It follows that some kind of redress exists to review administrative
action allegedly in excess of power no matter what the nature of
the administrative act. For those administrative acts which are
quasi-judicial (at least classified as such for purposes of review)
there is review by way of certiorari; where certiorari is inapplicable, the recourse is to some form of statutory review or review
through the extraordinary remedies including injunction and declaratory judgment. It is not enough, however, simply to say that
if there is some form of challenge of the power of the administrative agency to act there is an obvious remedy at hand. For while
202. 234 Minn. 221, 48 N.W.2d 175 (1951). See also Krakowski v.
City of St. Cloud, 257 Minn. 415, 101 N.W.2d 820 (1960). In the latter
case, the court applied the presumption to imply that the city mayor's

assistant was duly authorized to act for the mayor in discharging the
plaintiff, where such authority did not appear affirmatively in the record.
203. 218 Minn. 557, 566, 16 N.W.2d 884, 889 (1944).
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the court is generally sympathetic, there are problems of various
sorts which bear upon the scope of judicial review.
In that great mass of cases which are reviewed by writ of certiorari, there is no doubt of the power of the court to determine
whether the administrative agency has the power to act,2" 4 and it
makes no difference whether this potential lack of power is lack of
power in the sense of total lack of power, or whether it is lack of
power in the sense of excess of granted power." 5 Chiefly, however, the problem involved is one of the record, for the court on
certiorari cannot look dehors the record to make its determination.
Therefore, if jurisdiction is to be challenged by certiorari, the lack
of jurisdiction must be at the very least inferable from the record.2'0 In this connection it is important to note that the record
includes more than just the transcript of testimony; under the expanded concept of the office of the writ the extent of the return
which must be made to the writ has expanded also, so that it includes the record, proceedings in the nature of the record, the rulings of the inferior tribunal, and the evidence. 0 7 Even though
this kind of return gives the appellant considerably more material
than formerly out of which to spell lack of jurisdiction, the rule
that there can be no evidence dehors the record precludes any
challenge by the appellant to the completeness of the return."'
Some question then may be raised concerning the course of action
204. Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bongards Co-op. Creamery Ass'n, 253 Minn.
101, 91 N.W.2d 122 (1958); State ex rel. Anoka County Airport Protest
Comm'n v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 248 Minn.
134, 78 N.W.2d 722 (1956); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Commissioner,
245 Minn. 346, 71 N.W.2d 797 (1955); State ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts,
Inc. v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 223 Minn.
175, 25 N.W.2d 718 (1947); State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ., 213
Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942); State ex rel. Benson v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 186 Minn. 524, 243 N.W. 851 (1932); State ex rel. Dybdal v.
Commissioner, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920).

205. State ex rel. Anoka County Airport Protest Comm'n v. Minneapo-

lis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 248 Minn. 134, 78 N.W.2d 722
(1956); Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bongards Co-op. Creamery Ass'n, 253 Minn.
101, 91 N.W.2d 122 (1958). No certiorari case makes any such distinction

between lack of power and excess of power. It should be pointed out that

the lines between the various grounds justifying certiorari are always vague;

lack of power shades into excess of power, which shades into arbitrary ac-

tion, which shades into no substantial evidentiary support.
206. Beck v. Council of the City of St. Paul, 235 Minn. 56, 50 N.W.2d
81 (1951); Hamlin v. Coolerator Co., 227 Minn. 437, 35 N.W.2d 616
(1949). See 21 DUN. DiG., Workmen's Compensation, § 10426 (3d ed.
1951); Ramberg v. District Court, 241 Minn. 194, 62 N.W.2d 809 (1954).
207. State ex rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, 125 Minn. 425, 147 N.W.

820 (1914).
208. State ex rel. Weich v. City of Red Wing, 175 Minn. 222, 220
N.W. 611 (1928); State ex rel. Sholund v. City of Duluth, 125 Minn. 425,
147 N.W.2d 820 (1914).
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to be taken by the unlucky appellant who has elected review by
certiorari only to find that the certifying officer has omitted critical
materials from his return to the writ. The most obvious, but somewhat devious, course would be to compel the offending officer to
complete his return by an action in mandamus (or mandatory injunction, as it is now). The appellant might then be faced with
the reluctance of the appellate court to stay certiorari proceedings upon a record which it must consider conclusive pending the
coercive proceedings. Minnesota law is quite clear that the administrative agency must develop a sufficient record, and if it is insufficient, the court will remand to the agency with instructions to
complete the record. 0 9
In the case of the other extraordinary remedies, there is no question of their ability to reach and test questions of jurisdiction. The
only difficult point here involved comes in the application of quo
warranto, which applies to test the right of an officer to exercise a
power (complete lack of jurisdiction), but does not apply where
the officer is merely exceeding a power already granted." 0 This
is not an easy line to distinguish, of course; other extraordinary
remedies are not so fussy, and are willing to challenge jurisdiction
on any basis. One of the points not to be overlooked is that in many
instances this attack on jurisdiction through extraordinary remedies (except certiorari) is a collateral attack, and there seems to
be no particular objection to this mode of attack by the court. As
the court noted in Martin v. Wolfson, "Whatever be the character
of an administrative act . . . its legality may be inquired into by
a court, even in a collateral proceeding."' 1' Mandamus may be
used, for instance, to challenge the legal right of municipal authorities to discharge an employee;" 2 to challenge the legal right of
a city council to change the basis of a municipal judge's compensation; 13 to challenge the legality of a tax forfeiture; 4 or to
compel reinstatement of a state employee discharged without statutory authority. 5 The same is true of the remedy by way of quo
209. Minneapolis St. Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 251 Minn. 43, 86
N.W.2d 657 (1957); Festler v. Wallach, 245 Minn. 222, 71 N.W.2d 836
(1955); Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 19 N.W.2d 795

(1945).
210. See 37 MNN. L. REv. at 4.

211. 218 Minn. 557, 566, 16 N.W.2d 884, 889 (1944).
212. See State ex rel. McCauley v. Warren, 195 Minn. 180, 261 N.W.

857 (1935).

213. See State ex rel. Child v. City of Waseca, 195 Minn. 266, 262

N.W. 633 (1935).

214. See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Billstein, 204 Minn. 224, 283
N.W. 138 (1938).
215. See State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd., 226 Minn. 253, 32
N.W.2d 583 (1948).
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warranto.216 Prohibition, although in many respects merely an anticipation of certiorari, is designed for the express purpose of challenging jurisdiction in limine. However, by its very nature it generally does not involve collateral attack, but rather a direct attack
upon jurisdiction.2 17 However, in a proper case prohibition can
involve collateral attack, as in the case of Ramberg v. District
Court,2"' in which prohibition was sought to restrain the district court from proceeding further in an action in mandamus to
compel the plaintiff, the Minnesota Industrial Commission, to fix
wage rates in accordance with law. The Commission had already
fixed certain wage rates which, it was contended, were void because the Commission had neglected certain formal prerequisites
to such wage-fixing, and the action, therefore, called this jurisdictional point into question. Injunction has also been used for
the purpose of collateral attack upon jurisdiction." 9
The extraordinary remedies are not the only means of attacking
the jurisdiction of an administrative body, since under recognized
principles the same result may be obtained by collateral attack on
jurisdiction in a civil suit, either by way (typically) of defense to
enforcement of administrative orders -0 or by way of an attempt to enforce some kind of liability in the face of a contrary
administrative ruling. As usual the situation here is not completely
clear, since under well recognized principles of Minnesota law
collateral attack can reach only judgments or administrative action which are either unconstitutional or are made by a body with" ' It is not so difficult to decide cases on the
out jurisdiction.22
216. See State ex rel. Douglas v. Westfall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N.W. 175
(1902); State ex rel. Clapp v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 39 Minn. 538, 41
N.W. 108 (1888); State ex rel. Lindholm v. Parker, 25 Minn. 215 (1878).
217. See State ex rel. Minnesota Amusement Co. v. County Bd., 255
Minn. 413, 96 N.W.2d 580 (1959); State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court,
253 Minn. 462, 93 N.W.2d 1 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959);
State ex rel. Adent v. Industrial Comm'n, 234 Minn. 567, 48 N.W.2d 42
(1951); Nemo v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Local 556, 227 Minn.
263, 35 N.W.2d 337 (1948); Arrowhead Bus Serv., Inc. v. Black & White
Duluth Cab Co., 226 Minn. 327, 32 N.W.2d 590 (1948).
218. 241 Minn. 194, 62 N.W.2d 809 (1954). See also State ex rel. Sheehan v. District Court, 253 Minn. 462, 93 N.W.2d 1 (1958).
219. Slingerland v. Norton, 59 Minn. 351, 61 N.W. 322 (1894); Todd v.
Rustad, 43 Minn. 500, 46 N.W. 73 (1890).
220. Martin v. Wolfson, 218 Minn. 557, 16 N.W.2d 884 (1944).
221. Martin v. Wolfson, 218 Minn. 557, 16 N.W.2d 884 (1914). In this
case the court notes the difficulty of permitting collateral attack upon all
points, and says:
A rule which subjects an administrative order to the vicissitudes of
indiscriminate attack in controversies between individuals as they
arise can bring forth a variety of results, none of them final as between the next set of litigants. Only by adopting a rule limiting to jurisdictional and constitutional questions the right to attack such order
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constitutional issue, but it is often very difficult to draw a line between lack of jurisdiction and excess of power; in the latter case,
of course, collateral attack is not permitted under the rationale of
the cases.222 To the extent that this point is unclear, it places
appellants at the hazard of selecting the wrong, or a premature,
remedy.
A question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings-even upon appeal, although no objection was raised in
the course of administrative proceedings. 2 3 This is a necessary
corollary of the proposition that jurisdictional questions may be
raised by collateral attack.224
It is safe to say that jurisdiction of an administrative body to
make a rule or decision can always be challenged in some manner,
at least so long as the charge of lack of jurisdiction rests upon
firm foundations of complete lack of power. The only borderline
cases, where the litigant may involve himself in difficulties, are the
situations in which lack of jurisdiction is defined as an ultra vires
exercise of power, and even those are assailable in a proper action
or appeal, such as certiorari. It, therefore, behooves the appellant
to select the appropriate remedy within the designated time for
appeal.
4. Challenge of Administrative Action on the Ground of Arbitrary Action
One of the grounds upon which administrative action may be
challenged is that the action of the administrative agency is so
whimsical, arbitrary or capricious that it represents no exercise of
administrative discretion at all. Quite obviously this challenge is
closely akin to the charge of lack of jurisdiction because of ultra
vires activity, although it is stated as a separate ground of appeal.
Cases under this heading are comparatively few, but they may be
grouped into two general categories: those cases which approach
the problem from the point of view that the arbitrary activity of
in a collateral action can there be such uniformity in interpretation

and application of administrative orders as public policy demands.
Id. at 563-64, 16 N.W.2d at 888. The constitution itself guarantees the

right to collateral attack for jurisdictional or constitutional question, and

when such a question exists, there is no further question of the nature of
the administrative action. "Whatever be the character of a particular administrative act, whether executive, quasi-judicial, or quasi-legislative, its
legality may be inquired into by a court, even in a collateral proceeding. .

. ."

Id. at 566, 16 N.W.2d at 889.

222. Dunn v. Schmid, 239 Minn. 559, 60 N.W.2d 14 (1953).
223. State ex rel. Adent v. Industrial Comm'n, 234 Minn. 567, 48
N.W.2d 42 (1951).
224. Martin v. Wolfson, 218 Minn. 557, 16 N.W.2d 884 (1944).
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the agency vitiates the administrative act, leaving the whole matter
to be collaterally attacked by a mandamus action to compel the
agency to act (exercise its discretion);225 and those cases which
review the action of the administrative agency by one of the other
extraordinary remedies, which constitute a more or less direct attack on agency action. Of these the most common form of attack
is by certiorari,22 6 or to the same extent under the appeals statutes.227 Of course, in the certiorari cases the action of the agency
must have the requisite quasi-judicial character; where the activity

is quasi-legislative, injunction will lie to test the arbitrary nature

of exercise of discretion.22
Questions of abuse of discretion, however, represent something
of a move away from the comparatively clear-cut questions of
jurisdiction and to the extent that this is so, courts become involved in value assessments concerning the weight to be given to
the objective circumstances of administrative adjudication or rulemaking. Assessment of such matters is not the kind of speculation
which judges care to make if some kind of formula affords escape; therefore, the degree of penetration of judicial review in
this particular area is limited by perfectly predictable rules concerning the presumptive regularity of administrative proceedings.
The burden is, therefore, definitely on the party asserting the
abuse of discretion to prove such abuse.229 Sometimes the same
result is reached by asserting that the administrative agency has
broad discretion and deference must therefore be paid to the opera225. See State ex rel. Gopher Sales Co. v. City of Austin, 246 Minn.
514, 75 N.W.2d 780 (1956); State ex rel. So. St. Paul v. Hetherington,
240 Minn. 298, 61 N.W.2d 737 (1953); Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. City of Detroit Lakes, 221 Minn. 55, 21 N.W.2d 203 (1945).
226. See State ex rel. City of Minneapolis v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 238
Minn. 218, 56 N.W.2d 564 (1952); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Village of Rush
City, 230 Minn. 144, 40 N.W.2d 886 (1950); Stepan v. J.C. Campbell Co.,
228 Minn. 74, 36 N.W.2d 401 (1949); State ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts, Inc.
v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 223 Minn. 175, 25
N.W.2d 718 (1947).
227. See In re Applications of Minneapolis and St. Paul St. Ry., 228
Minn. 435, 37 N.W.2d 533 (1949); State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ.,
213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942); State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Sec.
Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920). See generally 1 DuN.
DIG., Appeal & Error,§ 397(b) (3d ed. 1951, Supp. 1959).
228. See Nielson v. City of St. Paul, 252 Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d 853
(1958); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49
N.W.2d 804 (1951); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, 234
Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951).
229. Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 248 F.2d 477
(8th Cir. 1957); Northern Pac. Ry. v. City of Duluth, 243 Minn. 84, 67
N.W.2d 635 (1954); State ex rel. Interstate Air-Parts, Inc. v. MinneapolisSt. Paul Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 223 Minn. 175, 25 N.W.2d 718
(1947).
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tion of the agency's judgment within these limits. 23 ° In effect, this
approach permits decisions of doubtful nature to pass the scrutiny
of the court, but the danger is that the court may sometimes unjustifiably enlarge the limits of discretion in order to avoid the
painful necessity of overturning some administrative decision (usually in the legislative field). In other words, the tests applied by
the court in the matter of abuse of discretion are subjective in nature and, for that reason, not entirely satisfactory, although it
seems difficult to attempt any other approach. Some comfort may
be derived from the thought that courts have applied their judgment analogously to the question of abuse of discretion by inferior
tribunals as a practice of long standing, 231 and it may be inferred
that the same judicial attitude carries over to the assessment of
administrative actions. On the positive side, the situation is one of
those case-by-case empirical matters, which common-law courts
have handled with considerable success in the history of law. Of
course, the charge of abuse of discretion can be raised in other
forms of attack, for example, under the more restricted challenge that the administrative agency was guilty of the application
of an erroneous theory of law, or that the evidence totally fails to
support the agency's findings of fact. Both of these circumstances
may in aggravated form constitute an abuse of discretion.
5. Scope of Review Upon Challenge of the Sufficiency of the
FactualBase
Certainly the most frequent of the challenges to administrative
action is the charge that administrative action is not supported by
the evidence. This type of challenge is for practical purposes and
for obvious reasons confined to the type of administrative action,
either rule-making or adjudicative, where a record is compiled.
By its very nature this challenge confines itself to the record, but
it is not to be inferred that the court views the question involved
as being a factual one. On the contrary, and in keeping with
the theory that the function of the appellate court is to consider
matters of law only, the rationale applied by the court is that it
can consider the record evidence only to determine its sufficiency
as a matter of law. Under this theory the court cannot justify any
interference with the administrative findings of fact unless the evi230. Nielson v. City of St. Paul, 252 Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d 853 (1958);
Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49 N.W.2d
804 (1951); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, 234 Minn.
419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951).
231. See 1 DUN. DIG., Appeal & Error, §§ 382, 399, 400 (3d ed. 1951,
Supp. 1959) and cases cited therein.
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dence in the record lacks probative force as a matter of juristic
logic.232 What is a matter involving juristic logic seems to be in
the end a subjective matter, and since the test to be applied is a
subjective one, it follows that the administrative findings are hedged by stout presumptions of regularity and support.2 33
Because the test of sufficiency of evidence is often even more
subjective than that of abuse of discretion, which after all is an extreme case, the limits are even less clear and the problems are
correspondingly more difficult. Some of this difficulty can be seen
in the differing statements of the rule which the court has made
from time to time.23 In the light of these statements it is difficult to start with a formulation of the rule regarding limits
of review of evidence. If there is one starting point more firm
than any other, it is the often-mentioned deference to administrative expertise in the form of a pervasive presumption that adminis232. The rule apparently has its origin with the often quoted remarks
of Justice Mitchell in State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council, 53 Minn.
238, 242, 55 N.W. 118, 119 (1893):
Other courts hold that the evidence may be brought up, not for the
purpose of weighing it, to ascertain the preponderance, but merely
to ascertain whether there was any evidence at all to sustain the decision of the inferior tribunal,-whether it furnished any legal and
substantial basis for the decision. The latter is the doctrine of this
court ....

The latest complete statement of the proposition is in State ex rel. Spurck
v. Civil Serv. Bd., 226 Minn. 240, 248, 32 N.W.2d 574, 580 (1948):
The function of the court on certiorari in reviewing the determination of an administrative agency is to decide questions of law raised
by the record, but not disputed questions of fact on conflicting evidence. Where there is no evidence to support an administrative finding
or the evidence as a matter of law compels a finding contrary to the
administrative one, as where the evidence was all one way and the administrative agency found to the contrary, the finding so made constitutes error of law, which it is the duty of the court to reverse.
Accord, Beck v. Council of the City of St. Paul, 235 Minn. 56, 50 N.W.2d
81 (1951); State ex rel. Dybdal v. State See. Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221,
176 N.W. 759 (1920); State ex rel. Schafer v. Buckham, 108 Minn. 8, 121
N.W. 217 (1909).
233. See In re Application of Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc., 248
Minn. 230, 79 N.W.2d 366 (1956); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 247 Minn. 6, 76 N.W.2d 107 (1956); Koktavy v. City of New Prague,
246 Minn. 550, 75 N.W.2d 774 (1956); Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of
Wheaton, 235 Minn. 123, 49 N.W.2d 804 (1951); Caputa v. Land O'Lakes
Creameries, Inc., 234 Minn. 514, 48 N.W.2d 895 (1951); Otter Tail Power
Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake, 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951);
Honeymead Prods. Co. v. Christgau, 234 Minn. 108, 47 N.W.2d 754
(1951); Schmoll v. J. W. Craig Co., 228 Minn. 429, 37 N.W.2d 539 (1949);
Hamlin v. Coolerator Co., 227 Minn. 437, 35 N.W.2d 616 (1949); Judd v.
Sanatorium Comm'n, 227 Minn. 303, 35 N.W.2d 430 (1948); Amundsen
v. Poppe, 227 Minn. 124, 34 N.W.2d 337 (1948); Liakos v. Yellow Taxi
Co., 225 Minn. 34, 29 N.W.2d 481 (1947).
234. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
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trative fact findings must stand in the face of anything except the
most convincing evidence on the other side. But at this point the
problems immediately set in, for the court must avoid any implication that it is deciding the facts of the case by determining the
preponderance of the evidence. We are left with one clear casethat which occurs where the findings of fact are supported by absolutely no evidence in the record. But beyond this, in spite of
protestations, the court must weigh evidence on both sides to decide whether such evidence as there is does, in legal fact, support
the findings. It may be going somewhat beyond permissible inference to say so, but in effect the rule may be that the evidence will
be examined to determine whether the evidence which purports
to support the fact finding, taken in the light of all the record,
including opposing evidence, amounts to more than a nullity. If
it does, then there is support for the finding. This is the process
which the court has characterized as a matter of law and hence,
within the reach of certiorari and mandamus," 5 although it
should be apparent that the application of the rule involves the use
of a subjective calculus based on the relative volume, quality, and
internal consistency of the evidence.
In its attempt to state a workable rule the court has used two
approaches, the first a positive statement of the rule and the second a negative one. In its positive form the rule is stated as a variation of the rubric that administrative findings will not be disturbed if there is a reasonable and substantial basis in the evidence for the finding.23 6 This rule has a number of variations
235. This is made explicit in State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Sec. Comm'n,
145 Minn. 221, 225, 176 N.W. 759, 761 (1920:):
It [the court] can only interfere when it appears that the commission
has not kept within its jurisdiction, or has proceeded upon an erroneous theory of the law, or unless its action is arbitrary and oppressive
and unreasonable so that it represents its will and not its judgment,
or is without evidence to support it. This principle of review is ap-

plied when it is sought to review by mandamus or on statutory appeal

236. See State ex rel. McGinnis v. Police Civil Serv. Comm'n, 253
Minn. 62, 91 N.W.2d 154 (1958); State ex rel. Duluth Clearing House
Ass'n v. Department of Commerce, 245 Minn. 529, 73 N.W.2d 790 (1955)
("whether there is any evidence to support the action taken"); Nyberg v.
R. N. Cardozo & Bro., 243 Minn. 361, 67 N.W.2d 821 (1954); Bozied v.
Edgerton, 239 Minn. 227, 58 N.W.2d 313 (1953); Beck v. Council of the
City of St. Paul, 235 Minn. 56, 50 N.W.2d 81 (1951); Rinne v. W. C.
Griffis Co., 234 Minn. 146, 47 N.W.2d 872 (1951); Honeymead Prods.
Co. v. Christgau, 234. Minn. 108, 47 N.W.2d 754 (1951); Nelson v. Reid
& Wackman, 228 Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544 (1949) (evidence "such that
the board might reasonably make the order"); Hamlin v. Coolerator Co.,
227 Minn. 437, 35 N.W.2d 616 (1949) ("evidence reasonably tending to
sustain the findings"); Judd v. Sanatorium Comm'n, 227 Minn. 303, 35
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which can be taken to amount to the same thing.2"' The negative
statement of the rule is that administrative findings will be disturbed if clearly and manifestly contrary to the evidence.2 38 In
some cases the court is careful to state the rule both ways.2" 9 The
point about both these tests is that they both indicate some kind
of examination of the record in the case followed by a weighing
process; but in the case of the "substantial basis" rule there is no
indication that the court must consider anything other than the
supporting evidence, and no Minnesota case has been found which
clearly states that the reasonableness of support must be determined by consideration of all the evidence in the appeal record.
On the other hand the "manifestly contrary" rule imports a weighthe evidence in the appeal record to determine relative
ing of all
40
2

weight.

The whole question of weight of evidence is made more perplexing by a failure on the part of the court to distinguish between
law and fact, particularly in those cases which involve so-called
mixed questions of law and fact. It is respectfully submitted that
such mixed questions of law and fact upon examination turn either into a question of fact or a question of law or two questions,
one of law and one of fact. The usual example of a mixed question of law and fact is the matter of employment, often a question
N.W.2d 430 (1948); State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd., 226 Minn. 240,
32 N.W.2d 574 (1948); Chellson v. State Div. of Employment & Security,
214 Minn. 332, 8 N.W.2d 42 (1943); State ex rel. Ging v. Board of Educ.,
213 Minn. 550, 7 N.W.2d 544 (1942); State ex rel. Rockwell v. State Bd.
of Educ., 213 Minn. 184, 6 N.W.2d 251 (1942) ("reasonable or substantial
basis"); State ex rel. Hart v. Common Council, 53 Minn. 238, 55 N.W.
118 (1893) ("without evidence to support").
237. See text accompanying notes 51-59 supra.
238. See McGuire v. Viking Tool & Die Co., 258 Minn. 336, 104
N.W.2d 519 (1960); In re Application of Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc.,
248 Minn. 230, 79 N.W.2d 366 (1956); Koktavy v. City of New Prague,
246 Minn. 550, 75 N.W.2d 774 (1956); Graf v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
234 Minn. 485, 49 N.W.2d 797 (1951); Nelson v. Reid & Wackman, 228
Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544 (1949) (the proposition is stated in the court's
syllabus); Hamlin v. Coolerator Co., 227 Minn. 437, 35 N.W.2d 616
(1949); Amundsen v. Poppe, 227 Minn. 124, 34 N.W.2d 337 (1948);
Lading v. City of Duluth, 153 Minn. 464, 190 N.W.2d 981 (1922).
239. See McGuire v. Viking Tool & Die Co., 258 Minn. 336, 104
N.W.2d 519 (1960); In re Application of Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc.,
248 Minn. 230, 79 N.W.2d 366 (1956); Koktavy v. City of New Prague,
246 Minn. 550, 75 N.W.2d 774 (1956); Nelson v. Reid & Wackman, 228
Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544 (1949); Hamlin v. Coolerator Co., 227 Minn.
437, 35 N.W.2d 616 (1949).
240. The rule is usually stated in the form that findings will be disturbed only if "manifestly contrary to the evidence." See McGuire v. Viking Tool & Die Co., 258 Minn. 336, 104 N.W.2d 519 (1960); Koktavy v.
City of New Prague, 246 Minn. 550, 75 N.W.2d 774 (1956). In such cases
the court appears to review the record as a whole.
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in labor or workmen's compensation cases. Here the question may
be, "Was he hired?"-a question of fact; or "Given the surrounding circumstances, was he employed?"--a question calling for a
legal conclusion; or, "What were the surrounding circumstances,
and does a particular configuration of them amount to employment?"--a question of fact and a question of law. At the outset,
it should be noted that there is nothing inherently wrong with review of questions of law upon appeal by certiorari or statutory
appeal; such questions fall within the certiorari rule. The vice appears to be in treating a question of law as a question of fact,
and thereby applying to it presumptions of validity which it might
not enjoy if analyzed as a pure question of law. This has led to
peculiar results in several cases. For example, in Koktavy v. City
of New Prague24 the appellant brought certiorari to review the
order of the Industrial Commission denying him workmen's compensation. The facts were complicated, but the question was a legal one of status of employment. The court referred to the question as one of fact, adverting to the usual tests of support for
evidentiary findings, and then reversed the Industrial Commission
in the face of what was apparently a fair amount of supporting
evidence. It is hard to escape the conclusion that the court was
actually treating the whole matter as a matter of law, although
its statement of the case was in terms of a matter of fact. A reversal on the law would not be subject to the very rules which the
court stated in the body of the opinion. -42 In Judd v. Sanatorium
Comm'n 243 there were two questions involved. The first one was
whether the appellant under all the circumstances was employed; the second was as to the capacity in which she was employed,
if the employment relation did exist. The first question appears to
be one of law inferable from fact findings based on disputed evidence; the second appears to be a fact question growing out of the
evidence directly. However, the court treated both the questions as
questions of fact, and on this basis sustained the finding of the
commission regarding the legal fact of employment on the basis
of the usual presumptions regarding evidence in the record. In
241. 246 Minn. 550, 75 N.W.2d 774 (1956).
242. The court, of course, could substitute its view of the law for that
of the commission without the necessity of justifying it on the ground of
lack of evidence. Compare Northern Pac. Ry. v. Village of Rush City, 230
Minn. 144, 40 N.W.2d 886 (1950), where the court in a similar fashion
reversed the Railroad & Warehouse Commission's order eliminating a grade
crossing in the Village in the face of what appears to be a substantial
amount of credible evidence pro and con.
243. 227 Minn. 303, 35 N.W.2d 430 (1948).
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Nelson v. Reid & Wackman'" the rule of substantial support
was applied to uphold what was apparently a legal conclusion. The
referee in that case denied compensation to an employee on the
ground that there was no "statutory notice" to the employer. Appellant argued that this finding (one of fact, of course) applied
only to the lack of written notice mentioned in the statute, and that
it did not negate actual knowledge on the part of the employer, a
circumstance also mentioned in the statute. Invoking the rule of
substantial support, the court refused to go back of the term "statutory notice," holding that it was broad enough to cover either
kind of notice mentioned in the statute.2 45 Quite obviously, interpretation of the statute was a legal matter, as was the effect of the
referee's finding in respect thereto.
From this review of the application of the substantial evidence
rule in the Minnesota cases it can be inferred that the details of
the rule are lacking in precision and that the court proceeds in
each case upon some sort of subjective feelings about the state of
the evidence. One may speculate as to whether in actual practice
the court can do anything else. The court can at the proper time
make certain things clear: for example, whether a determination
of the probative value of supporting evidence must be made upon
an examination not only of the supporting evidence, but of the record as a whole (or all relevant parts of it). However, it seems to
be an almost impossible task to define with any success at all the
mental processes which the justices must follow in deciding upon
the substantiality of evidence, short of a far-reaching behaviorist
study. This is, after all, a matter of judicial expertise which has
been handled by appellate courts for a long time, and attempts to
define or refine are rather likely to be unsuccessful.
6.

Scope of Review Under Proceedingsfor DeclaratoryJudgment

While the remedy of declaratory judgment apparently has somewhat limited application to administrative proceedings as a means
of judicial review, except as applied to administrative rules, where
it is expressly prescribed as a means of review,"" it is sufficiently different from other remedies to require separate treatment. Under the chapter of the statutes which provides for the
remedy,247 specific sections grant broad powers to the court to
244. 228 Minn. 137, 36 N.W.2d 544 (1949).
245. See also Graf v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 234 Minn. 485, 49
N.W.2d 797 (1951); Honeymead Prods. Co. v. Christgau, 234 Minn. 108,

47 N.W.2d 754 (1951).
246.

MINN. STAT. §

15.0416 (1957).

247. Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,
(1957).

MniN. STAT.

§§ 555.01-.15
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adjudicate rights in any situation where there is prejudicial
doubt.24 And while this breadth of power enables a court to
review any kind of administrative action, the jurisdiction of the
court has its limit in the requirement of a "justiciable controversy.' ' 19 The definition of this term is not without difficulty. A justiciable controversy is predicated upon a judicially protectable right
or status in the plaintiff which is placed in jeopardy by the ripe
or ripening seeds of an actual controversy."' It may be argued
that it is tautological to define "justiciable controversy" in terms
of a legally protectable right or status, since to identify a right as
248.
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power
to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be granted.
MINN. STAT. § 555.01 (1957). MINN. STAT. §§ 555.02-.04 (1957) provide
for application of declaratory judgment to explicit kinds of cases-contracts, statutes, and in connection with wills and estates. MINN. STAT. §
555.05 (1957) then expressly provides that the enumeration of the previous
sections is not to be deemed to limit the general power granted in the first
section; this view has been given judicial sanction in Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d 122 (1944).
249. This limitation is nowhere found in the statute, but is derived from
the classic statement of the limits of judicial power under the constitutional grant of judicial power to the courts. See Reed v. Bjornson, 191
Minn. 254, 253 N.W. 102 (1934); MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 1 provides:
The judicial power of the state is hereby vested in a supreme court,
a district court, a probate court, and such other courts, minor judicial
officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district
court as the legislature may establish.
250. The statement in the text is a paraphrase of the language used in
Minneapolis Fed'n of Men Teachers v. Board of Edue., 238 Minn. 154, 157,
56 N.W.2d 203, 205 (1952):
Clearly, in order to constitute a justiciable controversy, there need
not be such an actual right of action in one party against the other as
would justify a granting of consequential relief but only a right on the
part of the complainant to be relieved of an uncertainty and insecurity
arising out of an actual controversy with respect to his rights, status,
and other legal relations with an adversary party. Jurisdiction exists to
declare the rights, status, and other legal relations of the parties if the
complainant is possessed of a judicially.protectible right or status which
is placed in jeopardy by the ripe or ripening seeds of an actual controversy with an adversary party ....
An even more complete definition of the term "justiciable controversy" is
found in State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 92, 25 N.W.2d
474, 477 (1946):
Among the essentials necessary to the raising of a justiciable controversy is the existence of a genuine conflict in the tangible interests
of the opposing litigants. Complainant must prove his possession of a
legal interest or right which is capable of and in need of protection
from the claims, demands, or objections emanating from a source competent legally to place such legal interest or right in jeopardy.
Perhaps it is of little importance to point out the difficulties of a definition which includes as one of its terms the desideratum itself-the existence
of a legal right.
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legally protectable is to say that it is justiciable and to say that it
is justiciable is to say that it is legally protectable. To define justiciable controversy in terms of legal right is therefore to indulge
in petitio principii.However this may be, this definition on its face
implies an even further elaboration in order to explain when there
is a controversy, which in turn depends upon either or both of two
factors. The first of these is the relative remoteness of the plaintiff's interest in the subject matter of the alleged dispute;2"' the
other is the relative ripeness of the threat to plaintiffs right or
status.252 The first of these factors relates more nearly to the
problem of standing to invoke the court's aid to review, but the
second is closely related to the problem of scope of review. Complete absence of a threat means that there is no justiciable controversy, as in the case of State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland2 53 in
which the plaintiff, as a taxpayer, sought to compel action by the
deputy county auditor which would have been adverse to the
plaintiff. In addition, the scope of review of administrative action
is circumscribed by the selection of parties defendant, since the
court cannot grant declaratory relief against threats posed by parties who are not before the court. " In a fairly typical case,
Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n,2 5 declaratory relief was granted over the objection of "no justiciable controversy" in a case where the plaintiff, a fireman about to retire, had
been unofficially informed by the defendant that upon his retirement he would be ineligible for benefits. The alternative nature of
declaratory relief, 5 6 added to its anticipatory nature and object, 25 7
has permitted its use as an alternative to pursuit of administrative
remedies. 5
251. Minneapolis Fed'n of Men Teachers v. Board of Educ., 238 Minn.
154, 56 N.W.2d 203 (1952); State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn.

89, 25 N.W.2d 474 (1946).
252. Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d
789 (1957); Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 61 N.W.2d 508
(1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 949 (1954); Montgomery v. Minne-

apolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d 122 (1944).
253. 223 Minn. 89, 25 N.W.2d 474 (1946).
254. Frisk v. Board of Educ., 246 Minn. 366, 75 N.W.2d 504 (1956).
255. 218 Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d 122 (1944).
256. See MINN. STAT. § 555.01 (1957); MINN. R. Civ. P. 57; Connor
v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957); Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N.W.2d
122 (1944).
257. The court has recognized the anticipatory nature of the remedy by
pointing out its efficacy "before disputes become serious or well-nigh irremediable." Montgomery v. Minneapolis Fire Dep't Relief Ass'n, 218 Minn.
27, 31, 15 N.W.2d 122, 124 (1944).
258. Connor v. Township of Chanhassen, 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d
789 (1957); compare Starkweather v. Blair, 245 Minn. 371, 71 N.W.2d
869 (1955).
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As stated above, the remedy of declaratory judgment can be
applied in a proper case to review any kind of administrative action." 9 But in doing so the court cannot transcend the limits
prescribed by the constitution and custom. Therefore, while administrative proceedings may be attacked on the ground that they
are authorized by an unconstitutional statute,2 60 or on the ground
that such proceedings are illegal because not in accordance with
the authorizing statute,2 6' the remedy of declaratory judgment
may be used to challenge administrative or executive discretion
only if its exercise is capricious or arbitrary.262 Administrative
acts which are purely ministerial may be attacked only if they are
contrary to law.263 A suit for declaratory relief may be brought
against the state if the purpose is to clarify the operation of a
regulation affecting the plaintiff, even if the incidental effect is
to charge the state with a financial burden.264 In general, it can be
concluded that the rules which apply to the certiorari type of review also apply to declaratory relief with the exception that under
the certiorari type of review the objectionable matter must appear
from the record, whereas there is no such limitation upon review
by declaratory judgment. No cases have been decided in Minnesota
where declaratory judgment has been used by a party aggrieved to
review adjudicatory administrative action (although declaratory
judgment has been used in lieu of such action in Connor v. Township of Chanhassen265 ); therefore, nothing can be said concerning
259. See Benell v. City of Virginia, 258 Minn. 559, 104 N.W.2d 633
(1960); Frisk v. Board of Educ., 246 Minn. 366, 75 N.W.2d 504 (1956);
37 MINN. L. REV. at 20.
260. Reybur v. Minnesota State Bd. of Optometry, 247 Minn. 520, 78
N.W.2d 351 (1956); Arens v. Village of Rogers, 240 Minn. 386, 61 N.W.2d
508 (1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 949 (1954); Lee v. Delmont, 228
Minn. 101, 36 N.W.2d 530 (1949).
261. Ketterer v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 248 Minn. 212, 79
N.W.2d 428 (1956); Minneapolis Fed'n of Men Teachers v. Board of Educ.,
238 Minn. 154, 56 N.W.2d 203 (1952); Nollet v. Hoffmann, 210 Minn.
88, 297 N.W. 164 (1941).
262. Benell v. City of Virginia, 258 Minn. 559, 104 N.W.2d 633 (1960);
Ketterer v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 248 Minn. 212, 79 N.W.2d
428 (1956); Frisk v. Board of Educ., 246 Minn. 366, 75 N.W.2d 504
(1956).
263. See Nollet v. Hoffmann, 210 Minn. 88, 297 N.W. 164 (1941).
264. Ibid. The case involved a suit by an employee of the highway department to interpret a ruling made by the commissioner pursuant to statutory authority and covering the matter of vacation pay. A determination
of eligibility of the plaintiff would have incidentally imposed a financial
obligation on the state to pay for vacation time not actually taken. Nevertheless, the court was of the opinion that the suit was not one against the
state.
265. 249 Minn. 205, 81 N.W.2d 789 (1957). The plaintiff had the choice
of either bringing an action for a declaratory judgment or of pursuing
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the possibility of reviewing this type of administrative action by
declaratory judgment. It would seem logical to presume that declaratory judgment would be available to review such action
through charges of lack of jurisdiction, unconstitutionality of statute, erroneous application of law, and abuse of discretion; on the
other hand, a declaratory judgment action would seem to be a
long way around to obtain review for lack of substantial evidence. It may be argued that declaratory relief would be available
in all such cases where recourse to further administrative relief or
to regular appeal procedures is cut off by lapse of time and the
plaintiff is now threatened by enforcement procedures. In Starkweather v. Blair266 a somewhat similar situation arose. Starkweather, a state employee, was laid off because a legislative appropriation bill explicitly provided that no part of the funds were to
be used to pay his salary. He did not appeal the decision to the
Civil Service Board, but instead brought a suit to have his civil
service status declared by the court, alleging that through a special fund there was money available to pay his salary. The court
held that the suit was not barred by plaintiffs failure to pursue his
administrative remedies, but appeared to place its decision upon
the ground that plaintiff could not have been granted relief through
administrative proceedings because he was asserting the unconstitutionality of the appropriation act, and the Civil Service Board
was incompetent to hear such an objection. The court did not consider the point that the plaintiff, upon administrative refusal to
hear his case, could have had the point decided by the court upon
certiorari; the case, therefore, stands for the proposition that pursuit of administrative remedies is not required where it is futile to
do so. This leaves the question whether this rule will be extended
to permit the use of declaratory judgment action when administrative relief is not only futile but impossible. Since the Connor case
suggests that in some instances declaratory judgment can preclude
recourse to administrative agencies entirely, it would appear that
the implication of these two cases leaves a large open-ended area
in the field of review by declaratory judgment.
administrative remedies, in this case by attempt to get a variance from a
zoning ordinance. The court was doubtlessly influenced by the fact that a
substantial fine for violation accrued from day to day, thus putting the
plaintiff to a substantial hazard if he should choose the administrative
route and ultimately lose.
266. 245 Minn. 371,71 N.W.2d 869 (1955).
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7. Scope of Review as Limited by the Extent of Permissible
JudicialRelief
One of the ubiquitous offspring of the constitutional provision
on separation of powers2 67 is the limitation upon the authority
of the court to prescribe relief upon review of administrative action. The logic of this position, assuming the constitutional separation of powers, is unassailable-it is not the province of the court
to trespass upon either legislative or executive prerogative; therefore, review of administrative action must not include, in the guise
of relief, action which would amount to trespass upon one of the
coordinate preserves. The province of the court is law and law
alone; upon appeal to it, it can pass only on legal points. Its choice
in cases of appeal or certiorari or mandamus is either to affirm,
in which case the matter is at an end, or to reverse.26 The court

cannot direct discretionary action of the administrative body, since
this would be an unconstitutional substitution of its judgment for
that of the administrative body.269
The question then arises, what is the effect upon the administrative body of such a reversal? The effect is best stated in State
ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd.Y where the court said:2 71
It is sometimes said that on certiorari the judgment should either
affirm or reverse (quash) the proceedings brought up for review. This
is not a strictly accurate statement of the rule. A remand by the court
to an administrative agency upon reversal of the latter's determination does not dismiss or terminate the administrative proceedings. The
administrative agency is bound by the court's decision on questions of
law . . . . Where the judgment is one reversing the determination of
an administrative agency, the case should be remanded for further proceedings according to law. While questions of fact and policy are for
administrative and not judicial determination, the courts have power
to determine questions of law. . . . Where the court's decision determines the rule of law governing subsequent administrative proceed267. MINN. CONST. art. 3, § 1. See note 120 supra and accompanying
text.
268. The basic rationale is stated in State ex rel. Dybdal v. State Sec.
Comm'n, 145 Minn. 221, 176 N.W. 759 (1920). Specifically, on limitation
of the power of the court to affirmance or reversal, see Rock Island
Motor Transit Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 239 Minn. 284,
58 N.W.2d 723 (1953); State v. Northern Pac. Ry., 229 Minn. 312, 39
N.W.2d 752 (1949); Arrowhead Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Black & White Duluth
Cab Co., 226 Minn. 327, 32 N.W.2d 590 (1948); State ex rel. Spurck v.
Civil Serv. Bd., 226 Minn. 240, 32 N.W.2d 574 (1948).
269. See cases cited in note 268 supra and School Dist. No. 1 v. Lindhe,
195 Minn. 14, 261 N.W. 486 (1935); Rockne v. Olson, 191 Minn. 310,
254 N.W. 5 (1934); Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 122 N.W. 251
(1909). See also 3 DuN. DIG., Constitutional Law § 1593 (3d ed. 1951).
270. 226 Minn. 240, 32 N.W.2d 574 (1948).
271. Id. at 251, 32 N.W.2d at 581.
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ings, its decision is not a mere "gesture," but rather a final and indisputable basis of action in all further proceedings.

The court has directly held that a reversal by the court, even
without any express order for remand in its judgment, operates as
a remand and the administrative body is to act accordingly.27
Where the court's determination of the law is conclusive of the
case, as in a case where the court finds the administrative body
to be without jurisdiction or its application of the law to be erroneous, this would terminate administrative proceedings effectively.273 However, in a case where the evidence has been found to be
insufficient to support the findings of fact, remand to the agency
would in most cases leave it open to the agency to repair its position by further proceedings; 2 4 the same alternative would be
open in cases of abuse of discretion or of failure to follow prescribed procedures. One interesting and logical result of the
general rule concerning judicial power is that the court must either
affirm or reverse (remand) the administrative order as a Whole,
since affirmance of a part of an order amounts to a revision of it,
thereby carrying into effect by indirection that which the court
275
cannot do directly.
The constitutional requirement of separation is effective also
in regard to the other means of review of administrative actioninjunction and prohibition. Since quo warranto is used to attack
jurisdiction by questioning the authority of the agency as a legal
matter, it is obviously not involved here. Injunction, therefore,
will not be permitted to control the discretionary acts of administrative officers acting within the scope of duly delegated legislative
or executive authority. However, an opposite result is indicated
where such acts are without authority, or in excess of it, and the
other prerequisites for equitable relief are present.176 Of course,
an administrative official cannot be enjoined from performing a
legal ministerial act which he had a duty to do. 7 And although
the court has wavered somewhat in the past,2 7 it now appears
272. Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines,
Inc., 239 Minn. 284,58 N.W.2d 723 (1953).
273. State ex rel. Spurck v. Civil Serv. Bd., 226 Minn. 240, 32 N.W.2d
574 (1948).
274. See text accompanying note 209 supra.
275. Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Murphy Motor Freight Lines,
Inc., 239 Minn. 284, 58 N.W.2d 723 (1953); State v. Northern Pac. Ry.,
229 Minn. 312,39 N.W.2d 752 (1949).
276. School Dist. No. 1 v. Lindhe, 195 Minn. 14, 261 N.W. 486 (1935);
Rockne v. Olson, 191 Minn. 310, 254 N.W. 5 (1934); Cooke v. Iverson,
108 Minn. 388, 122 N.W. 251 (1909).
277. Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 122 N.W. 251 (1909).
278. Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388, 122 N.W. 251 (1909), discusses
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clear that injunction will lie even against constitutional officers of
the state,
at least since Rockne v. Olson,279 where Justice Stone
10
2

said:

Therein is no derogation of the independence of the governor, the attorney general, the auditor, and the treasurer of the state in their respective fields as constitutional executive officers of the state. Within
the constitutional limits of their jurisdiction they have an independence of official action no less complete and no less important than that
of the judiciary. But when litigation properly presents a question
whether proposed administrative action of an executive or administrative official is within the law, constitutional or statutory, both the subject of inquiry and the duty of decision are at once and automatically
removed from the field of executive to that of judicial action and duty.

An exception is made for questions which are purely political.
The writ of prohibition is limited in its scope to prevent judicial
or quasi-judicial actions which are illegal; therefore, the writ cannot be used against threatened administrative action which is classified under any other head, including acts which are ministerial,
quasi-legislative, or administrative. 8 "

a number of previous cases in the development of the law. See also School
Dist. No. 1 v. Lindhe, 195 Minn. 14, 261 N.W. 486 (1935); 37 MINN.
L. REv. at 21.
279. 191 Minn. 310, 254 N.W. 5 (1934).
280. Id. at 313, 254 N.W. at 7.
281. Nemo v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 556, 227 Minn.
263, 35 N.W.2d 337 (1948); O'Neill v. Kallsen, 222 Minn. 379, 24 N.W.
2d 715 (1946). The court stated the matter as follows in O'Neill v. Kallsen,
supraat 381-82, 24 N.W.2d at 716.
In no case is the writ available to prevent courts, corporations, officers, or individuals from performing a purely ministerial act that is
neither judicial nor quasi-judicial in its nature. It will not issue to
restrain individuals or nonjudicial bodies from exercising purely political, legislative, or administrative functions.

